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1
Human Resource
Management and Safety
Technical Efﬁciency and Economic Incentives

More U.S. workers die each year on the job than were killed in
the U.S. military cumulatively from 1998 through November 2004,
even after including self-inﬂicted and accidental military deaths (DIOR
2005). In 2001, there were 8,786 job-related fatal injuries (5,900 not
counting the fatalities caused by the terrorist attacks of September 11),
or about 3.7 fatal injuries per 100,000 workers. Workers made 2.1 million trips to the emergency room for injuries sustained from accidents
at work (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2004). Workers’
compensation insurance, which covers all medical expenses and part
of lost wages associated with injuries, cost employers $63.9 billion in
2001 (Williams, Reno, and Burton 2003). The indirect costs of accidents—lost wages, damage to equipment, and training and rehabilitation expenses—were several times this amount.
Human resource management (HRM) is usually viewed as an auxiliary function in a ﬁrm, contributing nothing to that ﬁrm’s output—a
cost tolerated because payroll, beneﬁts, and certain types of human resource activity must be organized before the real job of production can
be undertaken. But HRM practices can affect accident costs in three
ways. Two of the three pertain to the real or intrinsic risk in the workplace. “Real” risk is the level of physical danger of accidental injury
or occupational disease that comes from workers producing output. As
men interact with machines, both men and machines cause accidents.
Accidents can be reduced by modifying either part of the interaction: 1)
by increasing workers’ incentives to be careful, or 2) by modifying the
workplace environment to employ processes, procedures, equipment,
and ergonomics that reduce on-the-job injuries. In addition, HRM policy can reduce accident costs by lessening workers’ incentives to ﬁle
false or inﬂated accident claims for any given level of real risk.

1
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Most models of ﬁrm behavior ignore HRM, assuming management
simply chooses labor and capital to maximize ﬁrms’ proﬁts. As the
product price, the wage rate, or the rental cost of machinery changes,
so do the optimal production of widgets and the optimal conﬁguration
of inputs. In these traditional models, labor is passive with respect to
the production process in two ways: labor does nothing to improve the
technical efﬁciency of the ﬁrm, and labor always acts in the ﬁrm’s best
interest, regardless of labor’s own incentives. Management is assumed
to know everything the workers know.
THE IMBALANCE CREATED BY ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
But the traditional model is seriously ﬂawed, as there is ample evidence that workers are not passive. What workers know about their
own behavior or about the ﬁrm’s technology may profoundly affect
proﬁtability. Costs may also rise because of excessive consumption
of fringe beneﬁts by employees when legitimate claims are difﬁcult to
distinguish from questionable claims. Or management may ignorantly
be providing inferior plant design or unsafe production processes—resource misallocation that could be improved with labor’s help. Such
asymmetric information, where employees know something that it is
difﬁcult or costly for management to know, can yield costs that are unnecessarily high.
The collapse of the Enron Corporation is an example of how important asymmetric information can be, though the information asymmetry
there was largely between management and shareholders. Enron managers and accountants deceived shareholders into believing the company was in much better ﬁnancial shape than it actually was, having
information about company debt and revenue that the general public
did not have. This asymmetry of information was exploited by management, inﬂating company stock value beyond its actual worth in order to
increase management income and maintain management control.
While asymmetric information problems between management
and shareholders, such as happened at Enron, are a spectacular type
of asymmetric information problem, such problems also exist between
management and company employees. In most jobs it is impractical to
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monitor all employee behavior. So employees know more about their
work effort and level of care than managers do. Where such asymmetric
information exists, questions arise: Are employees working as hard as
they have agreed to work under the employment contract? Are the employees treating company property with the same respect and due care
with which they would treat their own property, so that there is no thievery, vandalism, or misuse of company equipment? Are the employees
being as safe as prudently possible? Are the employees only using sick
days when they need to use them? Are the employees only ﬁling lostwork insurance claims for legitimate, on-the-job injuries? These are all
areas where asymmetric information can drive a wedge between what
management expects and what employees deliver.
HRM Practices Can Treat Asymmetric Information Problems
HRM practices are increasingly viewed as one way the ﬁrm can address asymmetric information problems. The hypothesized causal link
between HRM practices and a reduction in asymmetric information
problems has HRM changing proﬁts: HRM programs provide workers with incentives to change their behavior by aligning their activities
with management’s proﬁt objective. Without these incentives, proﬁts
are lower.
This model cannot be tested in its entirety; too many model components remain either unmeasured or unmeasurable. For example, asymmetric information is not public information; it is not measured. Proﬁts
and even costs are not uniformly reported for all companies, especially
for small and medium-sized companies such as we have in our sample.
However, there is one important category of cost—safety costs—which
is measured in sufﬁcient detail to use in testing our model. The test is
simple: do alternative HRM practices affect employees’ injury claims?
Do some HRM practices help reduce injury-claim frequency? Do other
HRM practices help reduce injury-claim severity? If they do reduce
safety costs, is it because the HRM practices are improving technical
efﬁciency or because HRM practices are reducing disability beneﬁts
consumption associated with asymmetric information?
In this book, we estimate how various HRM practices affect occupational safety: which HRM practices lower ﬁrms’ workers’ compensation costs and whether their impact comes through changes in technical
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efﬁciency or through induced changes in workers’ behavior. We present
a model of safety outcomes in this chapter that illuminates the ways in
which HRM might affect safety outcomes, and in the next chapter we
use this model as a basis for reviewing the empirical research in this
ﬁeld. We present our own research ﬁndings in Chapters 3 and 4. In
Chapter 5 we draw conclusions.
THE ACCIDENTS-OUTPUT TRADEOFF
Either improved technical efﬁciency or labor incentives will lower
ﬁrms’ overall safety costs, including outlays for machinery, compensating differentials for risk, and lost work time. Frequently we ignore
the overall inﬂuence of safety. One long-recognized shortcoming of the
simple classical model is that it fails to take into account that the ﬁrm
produces not only output but accident claims with a given level of labor
and capital inputs. That is to say, in real-world industrial processes, accidents are a natural by-product of production. Getting rid of all job accidents is often feasible only with very large reductions in output. Even
white-collar workers occasionally bump their heads in their cubicles or
get paper cuts that may become infected; wearing special headgear and
thick mittens could prevent such accidents. We rarely wear headgear
or mittens in the ofﬁce because the reduction in productivity would
outweigh any gains in safety. On the other hand, sometimes we can
increase the level of output by ignoring prudent safety precautions—
such as by taking off the safety guards from machinery or removing the
guardrails along catwalks and stairs that inhibit the movement of materials—but accident costs resulting from ignoring basic safety practices
generally outweigh the additional output that would be garnered by doing so. There is a tradeoff between accidents and output.1
Another shortcoming of the classical model, mentioned earlier, is
that the human factors in the production process are not passive—employees may react to incentives, and employees may provide valuable
information about the optimal organization of production. For example,
when construction workers show management how a wall can be framed
more safely and quickly by assembling it horizontally on the ground,
rather than piecing it together vertically in the air, they provide valuable
information on the technical efﬁciency of the process. Because workers
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are assembling products every day and building techniques are constantly changing, opportunities for uncovering such technical efﬁciencies are abundant. When HRM practices lead to improved techniques of
production, technical efﬁciency improves. Accident prevention costs,
broadly deﬁned, fall.
HRM Practices Can Also Treat Safety Behavior Problems
Likewise, variations in HRM practices may change worker safety
behavior and the ﬁrm’s safety costs. Consider the time path of injury
beneﬁts, shown in Figure 1.1, typical of workers’ compensation laws
in most states—including Minnesota, from which we draw our sample
for this study.
Figure 1.1 Time Path of Injury Beneﬁts

Medical-only
payments

Date of injury

Two-thirds of lost wages replaced
by workers’ compensation insurance

Waiting period

Time since injury

The ﬁrst three days following the injury are known as the waiting
period in workers’ compensation. (It is three days in Minnesota; other
common waiting periods are ﬁve and seven days.) During the waiting
period, the injured worker receives no lost wage beneﬁts, though all of
the injury-related medical costs are covered by the ﬁrm’s workers’ compensation insurance policy. Hence, during the waiting period there are
only payments for medical treatments. After the waiting period, twothirds of the worker’s lost wages are replaced by indemnity payments
(payments for lost wages, in addition to the medical payments). Both
the waiting period and the partial wage replacement are types of insurance cost sharing. Insurance contracts are structured so that whenever a
worker is injured, he bears part of the wage-loss risk.
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THE PERILS OF MORAL HAZARD
Cost sharing, such as waiting periods and partial wage replacement,
mitigates incentive problems under asymmetric information. Behavioral changes resulting from incentives generated by disability and health
insurance coverage are known as moral hazard. In other words, moral
hazard exists when workers (or ﬁrms or health care providers) change
behavior for personal gain under an insurance contract.
There are many actions an insured worker or health care provider
can take that affect the size or the probability of a loss.2 With respect to
injuries that are temporarily disabling, for example, an insurance contract may specify that the only disabilities covered are those arising
from injuries sustained while on the job. Hence, a worker may claim a
given condition arose from a job injury and may seek temporary total
disability beneﬁts because his real health condition does not qualify under the contract. Or, the worker may have a recurring health condition,
such as lower back pain, which in the absence of insurance he simply
tolerates, since treatment would impose personal costs. When insured,
however, he may choose not to work and incur health service costs and
draw disability beneﬁts since others are paying the beneﬁts. An extreme
case of behavioral change might be overt fraud in which a worker—facing a pending layoff—claims injury beneﬁts when no injury or health
condition was incurred, either on or off the job.
Insurance contracts recognize that moral hazard is costly. If insurers
or ﬁrms had full information about all workplace injuries, they could
reimburse workers for all lost wages until those workers returned to
work. Under full information, the ﬁrm would know what injuries were
work-related and the ﬁrm would know exactly when the worker was
able to return to work. But ﬁrms don’t usually have such information.
Monitoring the behavior of all participants in an insurance contract is
costly, and the costs of such monitoring generally exceed the beneﬁts.
The workers know this, and since they have considerable latitude in
changing their behavior to enhance their short-run well-being, they
sometimes behave differently than they would in the absence of insurance payments. Therefore, the root of the moral hazard problem is an
information asymmetry between workers and ﬁrms—workers know
more about their own health status, as well as their preference for lei-
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sure over work (hence their willingness to feign injury if it results in
paid leisure time), than ﬁrms know.
Workers’ compensation insurance recognizes the complex incentives generated by disability coverage and alters the beneﬁts contract
so workers bear some of the costs of the injury themselves. They get no
lost-wage pay during the waiting period and only partial reimbursement
thereafter. These cost-sharing arrangements exist to induce workers to
take an appropriate amount of care on the work site and only the necessary time off work. HRM practices can affect those incentives.
An Illustrative Model of Three Cases of Worker Reimbursement
Consider a small construction company (Table 1.1A,B,C). Initially
assume the ﬁrm’s policy is to allow sick-day pay to reimburse workers for lost wages during the waiting period. We will call this the usual
case. We also assume a simple ﬁxed input-output process (a Leontief
technology) that requires ﬁve laborers to construct a building.3 Only
construction workers actually build; the foremen supervise workers and
help replace the labor services of injured construction workers. We assume the rate of building depends only on the number of construction
laborers, but the rate of concomitant accidents varies with the degree of
care exercised by the workers and the supervising foremen.
Since output is ﬁxed, the ﬁrm’s economic problem is to minimize
the sum of labor costs and safety costs. In this example, each foreman
is paid $100,000 and each construction laborer is paid $40,000. Each
accident costs $30,000 in terms of replacement labor and capital costs.
These are the only costs associated with on-the-job accidents. Initially, suppose a workers’ compensation system is in place that only pays
some of the lost wages after the waiting period, though the ﬁrm’s HRM
practices allow workers to use their sick-day beneﬁts to replace their
lost wages for the ﬁrst three days following an injury. Hence, injured
workers bear some costs of workplace injuries, though not any costs
associated with the waiting period.
Table 1.1A is the usual case, before any changes in standard HRM
practices are implemented. Our assumed Leontief technology is such
that with the number of laborers ﬁxed, the output is ﬁxed, and there is
no substitution between foremen and laborers in building production.
While adding more foremen doesn’t increase the number of buildings,
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Table 1.1A Usual Case: Partial Wage Replacement after the Waiting
Period

a

Number of
foremen

Number of
laborers

Accidents

Wage/salary
costs ($)

Accident
costs ($)

Total
costs ($)

1
2
3
5

5
5
5
5

8
4
1
0

300,000
400,000
500,000
700,000

240,000
120,000
30,000
0

540,000
520,000a
530,000
700,000

Optimal cost-beneﬁt level.

it does lower the number of accidents. Foremen monitor the safety content of work, and with more foremen present, safety costs fall, although
at a diminishing rate. Since output is ﬁxed, the ﬁrm maximizes its profits by minimizing the costs.
The tradeoff in Table 1.1A is simple: more foremen reduce accident
costs but increase wage costs. The ﬁrm’s optimal allocation rule will
be to add foremen until the marginal cost of the additional foremen (in
terms of the increase in wage costs) is greater than the marginal beneﬁt
of the additional foremen (in terms of the reduction in safety costs). In
Table 1.1A, the cost-minimizing level of output is produced by going
with two foremen. Going from one foreman to two increases the wage
costs by $100,000 while it reduces the number of accidents from eight
to four, saving $120,000 in accident costs. However, going from two
foremen to three increases overall costs: wage costs rise by $100,000
while accident costs only fall by $90,000.
Even though the ﬁrm could construct its buildings without any accidents by hiring ﬁve foremen, it does not choose to do so. The additional
costs (in terms of foremen’s wages) do not justify the additional gains
from producing with no injuries. It is not optimal to reduce the injuries
to zero. Indeed, in each of the three cases we examine in Table 1.1, it is
cheaper to allow some injuries than it is to do away with all injuries.
HRM Practices Can Worsen Incentive or Moral Hazard Problems
Suppose that we change HRM policy, but in a way that provides
fewer incentives for workers to take care. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the
new HRM policy guarantees that all lost wages due to an injury will
be reimbursed, not just those of the initial waiting period, without time
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limitation or a ﬁnancial cap to the total beneﬁts received: the company
makes up any difference between the employees’ wages and workers’
compensation beneﬁts through a wage continuation policy that guarantees that 100 percent of the worker’s nominal wage will be replaced.
With their pay as high on a workers’ compensation claim as it is on
the job, 1) workers could take more risks on the job than they formerly
did when they bore some of the wage costs of an accident, changing
their real safety behavior, or 2) workers might simply report more accidents than they formerly did, given the same level of risk. The former
is called risk-bearing moral hazard; the latter, claims-reporting moral
hazard (Butler and Worrall 1991). As the workers’ insurance coverage
under the new HRM policy expands, moral hazard potential increases
and the number of reported claims rises.
An example of this rise in injury rates, holding the level of monitoring constant, is given in Table 1.1B. While the output remains constant
at the same level it did in Table 1.1A, the accidents double for each
combination of laborers and foremen. With one foreman and ﬁve laborers, the number of reported accidents goes from eight with normal care
to 16 when laborers take less care because of moral hazard response.
As the number of reported injuries doubles, the value of additional foremen increases. In Table 1.1A, going from one to two foremen decreases
accident costs by $120,000; in Table 1.1B, going from one to two foremen decreases accident costs by $240,000. Because the marginal cost
of foremen stays constant, the increased marginal beneﬁt of additional
foremen increases the ﬁrm’s demand for their monitoring activity, and
the optimal number of foremen rises. In Table 1.1B the potential for
moral hazard behavior has increased, and the optimal number of foremen has risen from two to three.
Finally, as a direct result of the increase in the moral hazard under
the new HRM policy reﬂected in Table 1.1B, there are more claims, so
safety costs are higher for every combination of input (except for where
there are ﬁve foremen; here the costs remain zero).
HRM Practices Can Also Improve Incentive or Moral Hazard
Problems
Suppose that instead of “topping off” disability beneﬁts so there
were no wages lost when workers were injured, the ﬁrm adopted a
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Table 1.1B Moral Hazard Response: Full Wage Replacement Beneﬁts
Lower Workers’ Incentive to Take Care

a

Number of
foremen

Number of
laborers

Accidents

Wage/salary
costs ($)

Accident
costs ($)

1
2
3
5

5
5
5
5

16
8
2
0

300,000
400,000
500,000
700,000

480,000
240,000
60,000
0

Total
costs ($)
780,000
640,000
560,000a
700,000

Optimal cost-beneﬁt level.

policy that moved in a different direction: it adopted the HRM practices of Table 1.1A with respect to disability beneﬁts (only two-thirds
of the wage is replaced following an injury), but now it has added a
proﬁt-sharing plan in which it distributes 10 percent of the company’s
proﬁts to workers. Especially for a small company where workers can
more readily monitor each other and apply peer pressure (so there is
less likely to be a free rider response that mitigates the ﬁnancial incentives), this is likely to align employees’ incentives with management’s
proﬁt-maximizing efforts.4 We may suppose employees respond to such
proﬁt-sharing incentives by being more careful on the job or simply by
ﬁling fewer claims than in Tables 1.1A and 1.1B.
In Table 1.1C, the input combinations are the same as those in Tables 1.1A and 1.1B, but there are fewer accidents that result at each
level of input: Table 1.1C input combinations now have only half the
accident rates of Table 1.1A, and only one-fourth the accident rates of
Table 1.1B. Total costs are naturally lower for each combination of
inputs, and marginal beneﬁts of monitoring are lowered as well. Going from one foreman to two reduces accident costs by only $60,000,
but it costs $100,000 in additional salary to obtain this reduction: the
marginal beneﬁts from safety monitoring have fallen, but the marginal
costs stayed the same. Hence, less monitoring is optimal and only one
foreman will be hired to work with the ﬁve laborers. If we assume that
company revenue is $520,000, this implies proﬁt sharing of $10,000
with one foreman (10 percent of proﬁts = [$520,000 − $420,000] × 0.1),
$6,000 with two foremen, and $500 with three foremen. This minimizes
total costs at $420,000, given the new worker incentives induced by
the HRM changes. Indeed, in the absence of proﬁt sharing, the ﬁrm
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would revert to Table 1.1A outcomes and total costs would increase by
$90,000 (accounting for the proﬁt-sharing payout).
HRM Practices Can Improve or Worsen Technical Efﬁcacy
While the examples in Table 1.1 focused on workers’ incentives
(through risk-bearing and claims-reporting moral hazard) as HRM practices changed, those tables could just as well have represented changes
in production efﬁciency (through physical ergonomic changes) induced
by changes in HRM practices. If a change in HRM practices discouraged communications between worker and ﬁrm, it could worsen technical efﬁciency, and the results could be those pictured in Table 1.1B.
For example, if HRM practices included safety standards that didn’t improve safety but limited productivity—say, wearing thin, slippery silk
gloves when handling power equipment in an effort to reduce carpal
tunnel syndrome—then the change in HRM practices could conceivably increase accident costs. On the other hand, if the implementation
of new HRM practices improves communications between the worker
and the ﬁrm in a way that results in fewer accidents for each level of
output, then costs would tend to change as they did in Table 1.1C. Assembling some components on the ground and then hauling them into
place might be one such improvement. Changes in assembly sequencing, tool usage, and even product design might be other such improvements.
Table 1.1C Proﬁt Sharing Initiated: Incentive Rises to Behave So as to
Maximize Proﬁts
Number of
foremen

Number of
laborers

1
2
3
5

5
5
5
5

Accidents
4
2
0.5b
0

Wage/salary
costs ($)

Accident
costs ($)

Total costs
before proﬁt
sharing ($)

300,000
400,000
500,000
700,000

120,000
60,000
15,000
0

420,000a
460,000
515,000
700,000

Optimal cost-beneﬁt level. Assuming total revenue is $520,000, total costs including
proﬁt sharing are $430,000, $466,000, $515,500, and $700,000, depending on number
of foremen.
b
Represents one accident every other period.
a
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The discussion of Table 1.1 illustrates the issues addressed in this
book: the extent to which changes in HRM practices change accident
costs, which HRM practices are most effective, and whether those result in moral hazard changes or changes in technical efﬁciency. In a
world of perfect certainty and full information, the ﬁrm would always
adopt those HRM practices that were optimal, producing the best combination of technical efﬁciency and economic incentives. So any expansion of a practice, or adoption of a new practice, would result in lower
accident costs, given that output was held constant. But the optimal
combination might not always be obvious to ﬁrms because of informational asymmetries, contract restrictions, poor management incentives,
or inept bureaucratic procedures. In this study, we address these issues
using a sample of Minnesota ﬁrms. We chose ﬁrms from that state because we have extensive data on their workers’ compensation costs as
well as their HRM practices. Using this sample, we hope to estimate
not only which HRM practices are most cost-effective, but also whether
they reduce costs through a reduction in moral hazard or an increase in
technical efﬁciency.

Notes
1. See Walter Oi (1974) for an extensive analysis of this tradeoff.
2. See Butler, Gardner, and Gardner (1997) for empirical examples and citations to
the empirical safety literature.
3. Wassily Leontief, a Nobel laureate in economics, pioneered the use of production functions where the ratios of inputs to outputs were ﬁxed so there was no
substitution between inputs. This type of production has been used extensively
in short-term business forecasting and production planning.
4. The free rider problem arises when one worker does not incur the costs of taking care, thinking that all other workers will take care instead. Thus he is a “free
rider” in that he doesn’t incur the costs but plans to enjoy the beneﬁts (the extra
proﬁts) generated when others take care.
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2
Prior Studies of Human
Resource Management and Safety
The description at the end of Chapter 1 makes it clear that not all
human resource management (HRM) changes necessarily improve
safety. HRM policies implemented to eliminate all cost sharing associated with injuries, while they do remove income risk for workers, also
lessen their safety incentive. An example would be policies that ensured
that employees on workers’ compensation claims made as much money
as they would at work. Proﬁt sharing, on the other hand, might increase
employees’ safety awareness. In this chapter, we review prior analyses
of how various HRM practices affect safety to get a better idea of which
practices improve safety and which do not.
The workplace environment affects safety not only directly, through
the provision of safety procedures and ergonomic equipment, but also
indirectly, through interpersonal relationships and incentives generated
by human resource policy. Certainly, work can be stressful, and this can
harm workers’ health. Since the early days of scientiﬁc work management (Taylor 1947), workers have reported job dissatisfaction, psychological stress, and injuries (Walker and Guest 1952). As ofﬁce work
becomes automated, health problems and work-related diseases continue to be important issues in industrial relations and human resources
(Smith et al. 1981). Some researchers believe that stress results from
new organizational practices: loss of task control at work, scheduling
demands, greater specialization, increased electronic monitoring, and
job insecurity (Cooper and Smith 1985; Cyert and Mowery 1988; Majchrzak 1988; Smith et al. 1981, 1992). Research has accumulated on the
relationship between the work environment and stress-related diseases
such as mental health and heart disease (Cooper and Marshall 1976;
House 1981; Karasek 1979; Kasl 1978; Smith 1981, 1987). Recently
there has been increased interest in the effect of workplace organization on the incidence of cumulative trauma disease (Moon and Sauter
1996).

13
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These modern trends—and the press of domestic and international
competition—force companies to adopt new technologies, attempt new
management practices, and make use of new models of work organization (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; Cappelli et
al. 1997; Levine and Tyson 1990). Prominent among the changes are
human resource management (HRM) practices that provide employees
with participation rights in the decision-making process and ﬁnancial
ownership rights in the ﬁrm. While these high-performance HRM practices have attracted the attention of practitioners and researchers, previous research has largely been limited to how work organization practices affect ﬁrm productivity and proﬁtability. Little is known about how
the new HRM practices affect work safety; only a few studies have estimated how management culture inﬂuences workplace accident costs.1
The research reported in this study examines all three dimensions of
this HRM revolution: worker involvement in decision making, worker
involvement in ﬁnancial returns, and management involvement in the
ﬁrm’s safety process (i.e., management safety culture).
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING
Employee participation in decision making may increase information about optimal policies. Granting employees the right to participate
in the ﬁrm’s strategic safety policy—for example, increasing worker
involvement in the design and implementation of safety policy—may
improve workplace safety for both informational and psychological
reasons. Employee involvement in strategic planning usually occurs on
company time, so employees are essentially acting as paid consultants.
In this role, workers may cost-effectively identify safety improvements.
Workers are more intimately involved with risky production processes—including other workers’ responses to those processes—and so
can identify and monitor risk at a lower cost than ﬁrm managers or
outside consultants (Eaton and Nocerino 2000; Shannon et al. 1996).
Involvement with the introduction of new production technologies allows workers to voice their concerns about risk exposure during the
decision-making process. This may reduce turnover, increase worker
morale, and maintain the ﬁrm’s stock of speciﬁc human capital—all of
which may enhance safety outcomes.
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A second beneﬁt from employee involvement is that workers pick
up information about workplace risk. Workers’ getting more information concerning job risk and the ﬁrm’s safety efforts will help reduce uncertainty in their minds and thus increase the value of the employment
experience for risk-averse workers. This lowers employment costs and
may improve worker productivity to the extent that safety behaviors
depend upon workers’ attitudes and improved morale leads to higher
productivity.
Another psychological beneﬁt for workers of having meaningful
involvement in planning the ﬁrm’s safety policy is that they begin to
take ownership of safety outcomes, increasing their commitment to the
program’s successful implementation. This would also be expected to
improve safety.
We measure this participation effect both through a numerical count
of the types of decision-making activities the ﬁrm allows its workers
to participate in (the extensive participation margin) and the degree of
participation in those activities (the intensive participation margin). We
expect greater involvement in either dimension will improve safety outcomes.
Another control variable measures the extent of information sharing
that the ﬁrm engages in with workers concerning company ﬁnances,
human resource planning, and workplace safety. Again, for reasons discussed in this section, we anticipate that as information sharing by the
ﬁrm increases, safety will increase.
Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford (1995) ﬁnd in a survey of Fortune
1000 companies that 55 percent of the ﬁrms in 1987 and 48 percent of
the ﬁrms in 1990 had improved workplace safety and health as a result of employee participation. Quantifying the magnitude of employee
participation and the information employees contribute is not always
easy, as other inﬂuences must be taken into account. Not only is the
presence of one of these three dimensions of employee involvement
(company ﬁnances, human resource planning, and workplace safety)
likely to be correlated with the other two, but ﬁrms with employees involved in decision making are more likely to have employees involved
in ﬁnancial returns. Employee decision making may also be associated
with the age of the workforce or the extent of workforce unionization.
Since several correlated factors are simultaneously determining safety
outcomes, to sort out the inﬂuence of any particular type of program re-
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quires multivariate controls for other types of programs and workforce
demographics.
Regression analysis takes into account the inﬂuence of other factors included in the model. Deﬁnitive interpretation of prior research
is hobbled in two ways: 1) one or more of the key HRM practices is
omitted from examination (no prior study includes employee participation in both decision making and ﬁnancial returns as well as measures
of management safety culture), and 2) the variables are often examined
in a univariate, rather than a multivariate, framework.
Past Research on HRM Practices
Shannon et al. (1996) is an example of a study limited in both of
these ways. It doesn’t have any variables on employees’ involvement
with the company’s ﬁnancial returns, and it doesn’t present the results
of the analysis in a multivariate framework. The researchers examine
a matched sample of questionnaires sent to ﬁrms in Ontario with data
on those ﬁrms’ lost-time frequency rates (equivalent to the analysis of
claim frequency given below). Survey questionnaires include responses from both workers and management. The paper discusses only univariate statistical analyses that compare various workplace practices to
whether a ﬁrm has a low, medium, or high claim frequency. A multivariate regression analysis is mentioned but not reported on in the paper.
As discussed above, the absence of information about workers’ involvement in ﬁnancial returns makes it difﬁcult to interpret the univariate
correlations between safety outcomes and worker involvement in decision making. We must keep these cautions in mind when looking at studies like Shannon et al. (1996), which reports that lower claim frequency
is associated with greater employee involvement in the ﬁrm’s strategic
decisions on safety. Speciﬁcally, claim frequency was lower where the
level of worker participation was judged high, either by the workers or
by the management. We took particular interest in the close agreement
between workers’ and managers’ rankings of the relative importance of
the various safety dimensions surveyed. Such close agreement in that
survey suggests that our survey, which asked questions of senior human
resource management, may have elicited much the same response if the
questions had been asked of workers instead of managers.
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Habeck, Hunt, and VanTol (1998), Habeck et al. (1998), Hunt and
Habeck (1993), and Hunt et al. (1993)—extending the earlier research
of Habeck (1993), Habeck, Leahy, and Hunt (1988), and Habeck et
al. (1991)—relate the disability outcomes of 220 Michigan ﬁrms to
those ﬁrms’ HRM practices. This research is the ﬁrst serious analysis
of how management safety culture affects injury claims. In addition
to collecting survey information for the 220 ﬁrms, Hunt et al. (1993)
held extensive interviews with 32 of the 220 ﬁrms and ﬁnd a qualitative difference in those ﬁrms that engage in what the researchers call a
“participative culture.” In other words, they ﬁnd a qualitative difference
between ﬁrms that facilitate employee involvement in decision making
and those where the employees do not participate in the ﬁrm’s decision
making.
To capture the richness of the survey responses from the quantitative part of their investigation, Hunt and Habeck (1993) use factor
analysis to create eight HRM policies and practices into which the responses fall. One of these factors, “people-oriented culture,” is largely
about employee involvement in ﬁrm decision making. Of the 12 variables loading into this factor, seven pertain to employee involvement or
information sharing with employees:
1) “Working relationships are collaborative and cooperative in this
company.”
2) “Employees are formally included in the company’s goal-setting
and planning process.”
3) “The company achieves open communications, where employees
feel free to raise issues and concerns or to make suggestions.”
4) “The company shares information with employees about the ﬁnancial status and the productivity needs of the company.”
5) “Management seeks and considers employee input in company
decisions.”
6) “Employee involvement programs, such as quality circles and
labor-management participation teams, are used to generate
employee participation in company operations.”
7) “Workers have some control over work process and productivity
demands.”
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This factor is not statistically signiﬁcant in Hunt and Habeck’s
(1993) multivariate regression, but the results are suggestive: a 10 percent increase in this people-oriented culture variable is associated with
a 4.2 percent reduction in lost workdays rate, as predicted by our model.
This analysis focuses only on claim frequency, so the authors do not
report any analysis of claim severity. Our results on claim frequency
support the analyses of both Hunt and Habeck (1993) and Hunt et al.
(1993), and suggest little or no effect of involvement in decision making on claim duration. Their ﬁndings with respect to management culture variables (the focus of their study) will be discussed below.
Eaton and Nocerino (2000) examine the impact of safety committees on injury claims in the New Jersey public sector. They ﬁnd that the
existence of a safety committee is associated with higher injury rates
and speculate that this is probably because safety committees were
initially established in workplaces that were the most dangerous. This
sort of endogeneity may also explain the results of Fairris and Brenner
(2001), who ﬁnd that quality circles are associated with higher reported incidents of cumulative trauma injuries in an analysis of ﬁrms with
three-digit SIC codes, whose ﬁrm-speciﬁc data on quality circles was
matched with industry aggregates. (Teams and total quality management proved statistically insigniﬁcant in the analysis.)
While Eaton and Nocerino (2000) ﬁnd the existence of safety committees associated with higher injury claim rates, they also ﬁnd that
greater worker involvement in safety committees leads to better safety
outcomes. This is consistent with our expectations concerning employee decision making, including both the number of dimensions (decision
making, ﬁnancial returns, and safety process) that workers participate
in and the degree of that participation.
Rooney (1992) ﬁnds that employee participation in decision making
lowered the incidence of one or more Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) reportable injuries in his sample of 85 ﬁrms,
although his analysis excludes ﬁrm characteristics and workers’ average wages.
Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996) ﬁnd that wood product
ﬁrms with higher levels of worker decision making did no better than
those with less worker decision making, contrary to the authors’ expectations. One of the problems identiﬁed by the authors is that their
sample of employee-owned ﬁrms also comprised the ﬁrms with the
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most precarious employment outlooks, so their measure of worker decision making may have been confounded with the effects of expected
downsizing (which, for moral hazard reasons, may increase reported
claims). Moreover, the authors’ use of workers’ self-reports on ﬁrms’
safety may also have led to biased recall: conventional wood-product
mill workers seemed to underreport their accidents, while cooperative
workers seemed to overreport their accidents.
Rooney (1992) and Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996) compare employee-owned ﬁrms, in which employees are involved in both
decision making and the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial returns, with ﬁrms that are not
employee-owned, in which neither type of participation takes place. The
differential effects of decision-making participation relative to ﬁnancialreturns participation are not separated. Unlike the Rooney (1992) and
Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996) studies, Park (1997) estimates
employees’ participation effects by type, with one dummy variable
indicating any involvement in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial return and another
dummy variable indicating any involvement in the ﬁrm’s decision making. The separation of these effects is theoretically desirable, although
Park’s empirical implementation is somewhat crude: these dummies
distinguish neither the types nor the extent of participation within these
broad groups. For example, a ﬁrm with only a suggestion system would
receive the same value as a ﬁrm with total quality management, joint
labor-management committees, and an employee representative on the
board of directors.
Park merges Minnesota workers’ compensation claims with survey
data from the Minnesota Human Resource Management Practice ﬁle,
developed at the Industrial Relations Center at the University of Minnesota. He ﬁnds that employee participation in decision making lowers
the injury claim rate, as our model suggests, but that the reduction is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
Baril and Berthelette (2000) analyze correlates of early return to
work for a sample of Quebec workers’ compensation claims. Their
qualitative analysis draws upon detailed interviews with 16 ﬁrms.
Though no formal statistical analysis is drawn from these interviews,
there appears to be a consensus among those interviewed that health
and safety committees facilitate earlier returns to work, as does information sharing by management. However, the authors report that some
types of worker involvement actually impeded returns to work: returns
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to work fell when rigid union seniority rules made it difﬁcult to reassign
workers to new jobs, and returns to work fell in ﬁrms where multiple
unions were present. Multiple unions seem to impede temporary job
reassignments for injured workers.
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN FINANCIAL RETURNS
Employees’ participation in the ﬁnancial returns of the company
will change their safety incentives, but not unambiguously. Whether or
not employees take appropriate precaution against injury risk depends
in part on the incentives they have to do so, including the extent to
which they will bear the cost of failing to take care. This is one reason
that workers’ compensation beneﬁts do not fully replace lost wages.
Since the claimant bears some of the lost wage costs, he has greater
incentive to take care before an accident occurs and a greater incentive
to return to work once an accident has taken place. Incentives are important because in many workplace accidents information is asymmetric: claimants’ return-to-work capability is difﬁcult to observe directly;
often the injured worker knows more about his work ability than does
the ﬁrm.
If employees take advantage of this informational asymmetry by
changing their behavior because of insurance coverage, there is said to
be moral hazard. For example, the extent of back pain is generally assessed through a worker’s self-report of pain. If that worker’s disability
beneﬁts were as high as his wages, and the worker didn’t like either his
job or his work supervisor, he might choose to stay away from the job
longer after the onset of back pain symptoms than he would in the absence of insurance coverage. Partial insurance coverage, as is discussed
above, is one way insurance attempts to limit such moral hazard, by
making the insured employee bear some of the cost of being away from
work.
Another mechanism for limiting worker moral hazard would be to
involve the worker in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns. Employee participation in ﬁnancial returns is measured by the number of programs through
which the worker shares in the ﬁnancial outcomes of the ﬁrm. To the
extent that involvement with the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns affects workers’
expected income, they will tend to be more cautious if they can increase
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the ﬁrm’s proﬁts (and hence their income) by doing so. In experiencerated ﬁrms, for example, workers could reduce insurance premiums by
ﬁling fewer claims and could lower training costs and minimize reductions in output by missing fewer days of work.
Moral hazard may also be a problem with the ﬁrm: experience rating of the ﬁrm’s insurance premiums (where a ﬁrm’s future premiums
depend on the current claims, so that higher-than-expected claims raise
premiums) may induce ﬁrms to deny more claims than they would in
the absence of experience rating, in order to reduce their insurance costs
and increase their proﬁtability. Sharing those proﬁts with the employees
through ﬁnancial participation rights lowers the incentive for ﬁrms to
engage in such moral hazard behavior as well.
Involving workers in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns also increases workers’ willingness to provide information concerning effective changes in
HRM policy and practice. To the extent that this increases the returns to
safety investments, or lowers the costs of safety investments, accidents
will fall. The demand for safety outcomes may also increase if participation in ﬁnancial returns increases workers’ wealth and thus lowers
their willingness to bear workplace risk.
However, an increase in ﬁnancial returns may increase accidents
as well. If bearing more risk increases the expected proﬁtability of the
ﬁrm more than the perceived costs (i.e., working without a possibly
cumbersome safety guard, or working long hours without rest), then the
employee may actually have less incentive to take care, and injuries and
injury claims may rise.
Finally, participation in ﬁnancial returns may be ineffective in lowering workplace safety costs because of the free rider problem: if each
worker perceives that his contribution to ﬁrm safety is negligible and if
safety maintenance is costly, he will let others take care while he does
not. But to the extent that others feel this way, no one takes care, and
the effects of employee participation on safety outcomes will be muted.
Employees will ride for free by beneﬁting from the system without contributing to it. For example, workers with lower back pain might not ﬁle
a claim if they thought they would bear the full costs of the claim. But
if they were to realize that they would gain the full beneﬁts but share
(indirectly) in only a fraction of the costs, they would ﬁle. So if the extent of ownership is too small to overcome the free rider problem, moral
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hazard claims may be ﬁled even if there is some involvement with the
ﬁnancial returns of the company.
Employee participation in decision making may help to diminish
the free rider potential by increasing workers’ involvement and lowering the incentive for workers to engage in opportunistic behaviors: if
employees’ ﬁnancial participation increases peer monitoring pressures,
for example, free riding may be reduced.
Most research on employees’ ﬁnancial involvement with the ﬁrm
centers on comparisons of employee-owned ﬁrms with ﬁrms in which
the employee has no ownership interests; the research ignores other
forms of employee involvement in the company’s ﬁnancial returns.
Rooney (1992) and Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996), as reported in the last section, compare employee-owned ﬁrms that had
employee participation in decision making with ﬁrms that lacked employee participation in ﬁnancial returns or decision making. Rooney
(1992) ﬁnds that employee ownership (along with employee participation in decision making, as discussed in the last section) lowered the
incidence of one or more OSHA-reportable injuries among companies
in his sample of 85 ﬁrms. Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg (1996) ﬁnd
that wood product ﬁrms with employee ownership had no better safety
outcomes than those without employee ownership. These researchers
could not disentangle the effects of participation in ﬁnancial returns
from participation in decision making, and they only examined one dimension of participation in ﬁnancial returns: whether or not the ﬁrm
was employee-owned. In addition, these analyses don’t control for any
ﬁrm characteristics (though Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg [1996]
match ﬁrms in their sample) and may suffer from recall bias and sample
selection bias, as noted in the previous section.
Unlike the Rooney (1992) and Grunberg, Moore, and Greenberg
(1996) studies, Park (1997) distinguishes between decision-making
participation and ﬁnancial-returns participation in his study of Minnesota workers’ compensation claims. Unexpectedly, Park found that employee participation in ﬁnancial returns increased the injury rate, as did
the interaction between ﬁnancial returns and decision making. That is,
as employee participation in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns rose, so did the
injury rate, and the injury rate rose even more in ﬁrms with employee
participation both in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns and in the ﬁrm’s deci-
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sion making. This is contrary to our theoretical expectations, as given
above.2
In an analysis of 117 California ﬁrms, Hakala (1994) reports that
workers’ compensation experience modiﬁcation fell as the degree of
employee ownership increased. However, a ﬁrm’s experience modiﬁcation—an adjustment in its premiums according to whether the ﬁrm’s
losses are above or below the mean level in its risk class—depends
on a ﬁrm’s risk classiﬁcation, making interclassiﬁcation comparisons
tenuous. Since the number of ﬁrm-level control variables is minimal
in Hakala’s research (as it is in Rooney’s [1992] research), the ﬁndings
need to be interpreted with caution.
MANAGEMENT SAFETY CULTURE
Management safety culture means the employer’s commitment and
leadership in making a safer workplace environment. In this research,
our empirical measure of management safety culture is a Likert scale
index of responses to the following issues:3
1) management’s support for clear goals and objectives on safety
and health policy,
2) management’s leadership in setting goals on safety and health,
3) management’s interest in safety and health issues as a part of
the ﬁrm’s strategic level of decision making,
4) management’s willingness to share safety-related information
with employees, and
5) management’s commitment to reemployment of disabled workers and a return-to-work program for injured employees.
An increase in management safety culture should have the same impact on safety outcomes as an increase in worker participation in safety
decision making, for similar reasons: as more management resources
are employed toward integrating safety within overall corporate strategy—and as more ways are found to minimize post-injury return-towork hurdles—accident costs will be reduced. To the extent this happens, the returns to safety investments increase, the level of job safety
rises, and time away from work because of injuries falls. Higher values
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of our measure of management safety culture should be associated with
greater safety outcomes.
Improved management safety culture has been shown to be associated with lower accident rates in some industries. Moses and Savage
(1992, 1994) analyze the Federal Highway Administration’s audit questions asked of all truck and bus companies. This audit consists of 57
yes-or-no questions that are used to rate carriers as satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or conditional. Unsatisfactory ratings trigger educational efforts and an additional, more detailed audit. Among the variables most
predictive of accident rates are questions concerning the management
safety culture of the carriers: Moses and Savage ﬁnd that the lowest
accident rates occur among carriers whose senior management report
they are concerned with safety and communicate that concern to their
employees.
Habeck et al. (1991) ﬁnd that ﬁrms practicing poor disability management techniques had twice as many OSHA-recordable injuries but
four times as many workers’ compensation claims as ﬁrms practicing
effective disability management. Hunt and Habeck (1993) reach a similar conclusion in their noted study of 220 Michigan companies. They
ﬁnd that management diligence concerning workplace safety, and policies providing for a proactive return to work, are associated with fewer
disability claims and shorter disability durations. In particular, Hunt and
Habeck’s (1993) “Active Safety Leadership” factor focuses on many of
the same elements as does our management safety culture; indeed, all
13 of the variables loading into this factor directly or indirectly deal
with management safety culture as we have deﬁned it.4 The authors
ﬁnd that as Active Safety Leadership increases by 10 percent, claim
frequency falls by 5.7 percent, a decline that is statistically signiﬁcant.
Our results on claim frequency support Habeck and Hunt’s analysis,
though our estimated response is larger than theirs. Moreover, we also
ﬁnd quantitatively large and statistically signiﬁcant responses in claim
severity, which reinforce the effect of lower claim frequency.
Hunt et al. (1993) also ﬁnd that neither efforts to enhance wellness
in workers nor ergonomic solutions prove to be effective in improving
disability outcomes. In fact, ergonomic solutions to prevent injury and
subsequent disability actually result in slightly higher disability rates.
Although the result is odd, it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
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Shannon et al. (1996) report that lower claim frequency is associated with more management involvement in the ﬁrm’s safety process.
Speciﬁcally, claim frequency is lowest where management safety culture is strongest: where health and safety responsibilities are part of the
manager’s job description, where health and safety are an important
part of his annual salary review, and where senior management attend
the ﬁrm’s health and safety committee meetings. That is to say, claim
frequency is lower where management perceives itself—and is perceived by workers—as doing an effective job in supervision, and where
management ranks health and safety as a high moral concern.
Claim frequency is also lower in the Shannon et al. (1996) sample,
where a long-term disability plan is provided. The cost of such plans,
whether by experience-rated premiums or by self-insurance, reﬂects the
long-term safety experience of the workforce. Hence it is expected that
where such programs are in place, management will be more attentive
to workplace risks and will work harder to limit those risks. In other
words, it will have an additional ﬁnancial incentive to be involved with
the safety culture of the ﬁrm.
Baril and Berthelette’s (2000) interviews on early return to work for
a sample of Quebec workers’ compensation claims suggest that upper
management support is important. When upper management support is
lacking, safety committees are not able to exert any pressure on supervisors to encourage them to comply with the ﬁrm’s health and safety
rules.
Although a management culture of safety involvement may be established in places where there are perceived to be greater risk factors,
the management culture in our research and in the research of Hunt et al.
(1993) is assumed to have been determined by historical forces before
the current period, and not by safety outcomes in the current period.
We hope to minimize the possibility of reverse causality by including
industry and occupational risk variables in the analysis when examining the impact of HRM programs. Following earlier research, we also
treat the degree of employee participation and information sharing as
exogenous in our analysis.
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DOWNSIZING AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
There are no studies using ﬁrm-level data examining how downsizing affects workers’ compensation costs, though there have been several
studies examining how individual claims are affected by employment
status and how aggregate workers’ compensation costs are affected by
aggregate unemployment rates. Fenn (1981), using a British sample of
claimants, reports that claim durations increase with higher levels of
unemployment. Butler and Worrall (1985), relying on a U.S. sample
of claimants, ﬁnd that claim durations also increase from the incidence
of layoff or unemployment. Fortin and Lanoie (1992) ﬁnd that higher levels of unemployment are associated with higher frequencies of
workers’ compensation claims-ﬁling as well, and it appears that workers undergoing jobless spells are migrating from obtaining coverage
under unemployment insurance to obtaining coverage under workers’
compensation insurance. Hartwig, Kahley, and Restrepo (1994) and
Hartwig et al. (1997) ﬁnd that the business cycle is a good predictor of
workers’ compensation costs. In particular, as the unemployment rate
increases, workers’ compensation claim frequency increases. Hence,
layoffs and increased unemployment are likely to increase workers’
compensation costs.
There are numerous reasons why downsizing might increase workers’ compensation claims. Given the economic uncertainty associated
with a reduction in the workforce, those who perceive that they may be
laid off have some ﬁnancial incentive to ﬁle a claim: while he is on a
workers’ compensation claim, a worker may still be eligible for other
fringe beneﬁts such as medical care for the rest of his family. Moreover,
workers’ compensation beneﬁts replace two-thirds of a worker’s lost
wages tax-free, while unemployment insurance only replaces one-half
of the worker’s wages and may be taxed. In this situation, some of the
increased costs may be the result of moral hazard (Butler and Worrall
1991).
There are reasons why even those who are not laid off may be affected by the reduction in force. Downsizing frequently increases job
stress (Mishra and Spreitzer 1998), and stress is known to affect workers’ health and their tolerance for pain. Just as some professional golfers
can play with a sore back or some ballplayers can play with bad legs
when they want to, workers who enjoy their work or who are otherwise
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well compensated for their work can work even if they are experiencing
some level of discomfort. Once the rewarding, interesting work disappears or the work becomes stressful, then pain becomes more noticeable
(Fordyce 1996; Smith and Carayon 1996). None of the effects listed so
far represent changes in the real level of risk associated with work, so
these effects are generally considered types of claims-reporting moral
hazard. However, there may be real effects if the downsizing alters
the demographic characteristics of workers (such as resulting in more
younger or contingent workers), or it substantially alters working hours
(in that, say, full-time employees are now asked to work much longer
hours than formerly) (Capelli et al. 1997; Park 1997; Butler, Park, and
Zaidman 1998). If younger and contingent workers are laid off, then
injury claim rates will decrease after a downsizing (while claim duration may go up or down, depending upon the resulting composition of
claims). If employees work longer hours and thus are subject to more
fatigue, then job risk may increase and result in more injuries.
WHAT WE EXPECT TO FIND
This study goes beyond much of the earlier research and—following
the approach of Hunt and Habeck (1993) and Hunt et al. (1993)—seeks
to estimate the role of HRM practices in the determination of workers’
compensation costs in a multivariate framework. It uses a workplace
safety model that incorporates a wider variety of HRM practices than
has been previously employed. In particular, it analyzes the impact of
the three important dimensions of HRM practices on safety: employee
participation in decision making, employee participation in ﬁnancial
returns, and the ﬁrm’s management safety culture. In addition, this is
the ﬁrst study to consider the effect of each of these factors on claim
frequency and claim severity, and to ask whether any observed change
is the result of changes in technical efﬁciency or moral hazard (principal-agent) incentives.
As workers and managers get more involved with ﬁrm safety (and
as HRM practices increase within a ﬁrm), we generally expect that
workers’ compensation costs will fall. Although participation in employee-owned ﬁrms yields inconclusive evidence, prior research on employee participation in decision making—aside from employee owner-
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ship—indicates that greater participation in decision making and more
information sharing increases safety and lowers workers’ compensation
costs. We expect to ﬁnd the same results in our data, not only for injury
claim rates but for injury severity as well. However, our expectation
about the positive impact of HRM practices applies to claims frequency
results and to the overall change in expected costs per worker, but not
unambiguously to changes in claim duration. The ambiguous effect on
claim duration arises because a change in claim frequency may differentially alter the mix between long and short duration claims. The
observed average duration may increase or decrease as a result.
The safety effect of employee participation in ﬁnancial returns is
theoretically ambiguous and—except for employee-owned ﬁrms—there
is little prior research on participation in ﬁnancial returns. The ﬁnancial
return estimates derived from employee ownership are fraught with
problems of interpretation, as discussed above. We focus on variation
in the degree of involvement in ﬁnancial returns, aside from employee
ownership. If ﬁrm proﬁtability increases by taking more employment
risks, then accidents and workers’ compensation costs could rise. We
don’t expect, however, that that will happen; we expect that more ﬁnancial participation by employees will lower workers’ compensation costs
through either of the channels outlined in Chapter 1: technical efﬁciency will increase as workers have an increased incentive to raise output,
or moral hazard (principal-agent) outcomes will improve as workers
have an increased incentive to lower costs.
Like employee participation in decision making, there is some evidence that improved management safety culture lowers the injury claim
rate, and that greater executive involvement in the ﬁrm’s safety processes lowers the rate of injuries. We expect the same to be true in our
sample. Though this has not been examined in the earlier literature, we
expect that as the management safety culture improves (as our measures increase), the severity of injuries will fall as well.
THE DATA
In July 1998, the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry sent
out a safety survey to 230 state ﬁrms that had applied for a program
called the Minnesota Safety Grant Program. The Safety Grant Program
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awarded funds of up to $10,000 to qualifying employers for projects
designed to reduce the risk of injury and illness to their workers through
the purchase of new equipment and other physical improvements to
enhance workplace safety. Other costs, including the cost of training,
training materials, and labor costs generally, were not reimbursed under
this program.
Qualifying employers under the Safety Grant Program must have
been inspected by a qualiﬁed safety professional and have had a project
consistent with the recommendations of the safety inspection. In essence, projects funded were expected to reduce the risk of injury or disease. Employers under this grant were required to be committed to the
implementation of the safety project, including showing a willingness
to match the grant money awarded. This requirement of a commitment
may explain the relatively high reported scores on the management
safety culture index: either the sample ﬁrms were from management
teams deeply committed to on-the-job safety (not implausible, given
their interest in applying for the grant), or they merely reported on the
survey that they were committed, since the same state agency that supplied them with the grant money for their safety improvements also
sponsored the safety survey.
Preference under the Safety Grant Program was given to ﬁrms with
a signiﬁcant employment presence in their geographical area, and to
ﬁrms where jobs were at risk because of safety shortcomings. This
tended to favor small and medium-sized ﬁrms established in less urban
areas of the state.
Some 121 ﬁrms completed the survey forms, for a sample response
rate of 53 percent. The survey consists of 11 sections, covering the general safety record of the company, company and employee characteristics, management culture, human resource practices, safety practices,
and safety consultation programs provided by the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MNOSHA) consultation unit.
Table 2.1 summarizes the question items included in the 22-page survey.
These 121 ﬁrms have matched with about 5,125 workers’ compensation
indemnity claims for the years 1990 through 1998—that is, the claims
were ﬁled by workers of those 121 ﬁrms. Federal employer identiﬁcation numbers were only available for about 10 percent of the sample and
have proven to be unreliable for matching. Hence, we used the name of
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Section
Section I

Section title
Workplace Safety Statistical Data

Content
Safety records and other general information of the respondent ﬁrm
• SIC (Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation) codes
• OSHA 200 log information for the past ﬁve years
• workers’ compensation premium and covered payroll for the past ﬁve years
• OSHA compliance, number of work sites

Section II

Company and Employee
Characteristics

Information on employee characteristics and general employer characteristics
• number of nonmanagerial workers
• recent layoffs or cutbacks in employees
• number of shifts operated and frequency of employee shift changes
• workforce demography (age, education, tenure, gender, race), occupational mix

Section III

Management Culture and HRM
Practices

Top management’s commitment in safety and health policy and employee
participation practices
• management culture (management’s strategic involvement in safety practices)
• employee participation in safety practices (safety committees, union
negotiations, ergonomics, performance review, certiﬁcation requirements,
return-to-work program, etc.)
• employee involvement in ﬁrm decision making (quality circles, work teams,
Total Quality Management, representation on the board of directors, etc.)
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• employee involvement in ﬁnancial incentive programs (proﬁt sharing, gain
sharing, employee stock ownership plan, group bonus plan, 401(k), etc.)
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Table 2.1 Contents of Minnesota Workplace Safety Practices (MWSP) Survey
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Safety Practices

Respondent ﬁrm’s current safety practices and policies

Section V

Experience with Workplace Safety
and Health Consultation Service

Respondent ﬁrm’s experience with Safety and Health Consultation Service,
including OSHA workplace consultation services

Section VI

Safety Committees

Respondent ﬁrm’s experience with Labor-Management Safety Committee

Section VII

Minnesota Safety Grant Program

Respondent ﬁrm’s experience with Minnesota Safety Grant Program

Section VIII

Minnesota Log Safe Program

Respondent ﬁrm’s experience with Minnesota Log Safe Program

Section IX

Minnesota Workplace Violence
Program

Respondent ﬁrm’s experience with Minnesota Workplace Violence Program

Section X

Minnesota Safety and Health
Achievement Recognition
Program (MNSHARP)

Respondent ﬁrm’s experience with Minnesota Safety and Health Achievement
Recognition Program (MNSHARP)

Section XI

General Respondent Information

Marketing information about OSHA consultation programs

NOTE: In Section V, only general features of consultation services are covered. Individual-speciﬁc OSHA consultation programs are
presented starting in Section VI of the MWSP Survey.
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the ﬁrm in matching the two databases (i.e., matching the survey data
with the workers’ compensation administrative claims data).
The matching process involves three steps. First, we wrote an SAS
program that screened the possible matches by searching over relevant
character strings. If the ﬁrm were named “Park Inc.,” for example, the
SAS program would ﬁlter out all similar possible names, including
“Parks Incorporated,” “SPARK INC.,” “PARK Inc.,” “BALLPARK
Inc.,” etc. Second, a researcher at the Minnesota Department of Labor
and Industry familiar with the Minnesota workers’ compensation database checked each potential match. Third, we veriﬁed the matches by
using the company’s zip code from the addresses given in both data
sets.
Following this procedure, we merge ﬁrm-level data from the survey
to claimant-level data from Minnesota’s workers’ compensation ﬁles at
the Department of Labor and Industry. Since costs are the product of
claim frequency, claim duration, and beneﬁts, we partition our statistical analysis into claim frequency and claim duration components to see
whether the HRM practices affect claim frequency, claim duration, or
both. This will provide evidence about whether costs are reduced either
because of loss prevention effects (in that a particular practice reduces
the number of claims) or loss control effects (in that a particular practice limits the costs of those injuries that have occurred). We assume
that the beneﬁt parameters (maximum and minimum beneﬁts) are exogenous relative to the choices made by the ﬁrms in our survey and do
not model beneﬁt determination here.
As a result of our desire to partition HRM effects into their claim
frequency and claim duration components, our descriptive sample statistics vary by type of analysis. These descriptive statistics are given in
the empirical work in the next two chapters of the monograph, next to
the corresponding analysis relevant to the descriptive statistics.
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Notes
1. For notable exceptions, see Hunt et al. (1993), Park (1997), and Rooney (1992).
2. Park (1997) offers one possible explanation: “The ﬁrms with relatively more
hazardous working conditions may implement various types of safety-enhancing efforts, including the practice of employee involvement plans in workplace
safety issues” (p. 81)—in other words, reverse causality.
3. Likert scales were developed in 1932 by Rensis Likert, an organizational psychologist, as the familiar ﬁve-point bipolar response format that asks people to
gauge their responses by how much they support or don’t support (something),
how much they are willing or not willing, etc., based on at least a ﬁve-response
scale—often a seven-response scale is employed. At one end of the scale would
be something like “Strongly support”; at the other end, “Strongly oppose.” These
scales are widely used in education, psychology, and sociology.
4. For more on the Active Safety Leadership factor, see also Habeck, Hunt, and
VanTol (1998), Habeck et al. (1998), and Hunt et al. (1993).
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3
Earlier Safety and HRM Practices
Employee Participation, Management
Safety Culture, and Corporate Downsizing

CORPORATE DOWNSIZING AND HRM PRACTICES:
THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
To gauge the inﬂuence of human resource management (HRM)
practice on corporate safety, we estimate the direct and indirect effects
of HRM practice on the ﬁrm’s lost workday costs due to injury. In particular, we examine how lost workday costs vary along different HRM
dimensions, as discussed in the last chapter. These dimensions are 1)
the extent and intensity of employees’ decision-making involvement
and the level of employees’ ﬁnancial involvement in the company’s performance, and 2) indices of management’s commitment to workplace
safety and the extent of management’s information sharing. We calculate the estimated strength of these effects by their coefﬁcients in claim
frequency and claim duration regressions, then we relate the effects to
their implied safety beneﬁts.
The indirect effects of these programs may also be important. Anecdotal evidence suggests that injury claims tend to increase with announced reductions in workforce or as local unemployment rates rise.
We estimate how layoffs affect claim duration by including a dummy
variable indicating whether the ﬁrm has experienced any recent employment layoffs or cutbacks. In our models, we were also interested to see
whether any of the corporate safety culture variables listed in the previous paragraph modify the layoff/claim-duration effect: that is, whether
there are interactions between HRM practices and downsizing.
Competitive pressures to restructure the workplace by adopting new
technologies, new management practices, new work tasks or processes,
and new models of work organization give greater impetus to ﬁnding
HRM practices that improve ﬁrms’ performance (Appelbaum and Batt
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1994; Cappelli et al. 1997; Levine and Tyson 1990). The search for
improved performance not only has changed work processes for many
employees, it also has led to changes in the size of the workforce itself.
Corporations seek to become more cost-competitive by reducing their
number of employees. Corporations also seek to become efﬁcient by
changing their corporate safety culture. For example, they may change
the level of employee involvement or the types of safety programs they
employ.
CLAIM FREQUENCY RESULTS
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 indicate a relatively high lostwork-time injury rate (.06) and a substantial amount of downsizing
(32.6 percent had experienced downsizing of their workforce in the 12
months preceding the sample survey date), reﬂecting the dynamics of
the midsize and small ﬁrms in the sample. Twenty-ﬁve companies are
represented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in our analysis of claim frequency;
some of these companies provide two or three years’ worth of data. The
relatively small sample size occurs because the “percentage of production workers” variable is missing in many of the surveys. We include
percentage of production workers (and deal with the smaller sample
size) in the analysis, however, because it is the best proxy we have
for occupational differences (hence, intrinsic workplace risk) between
ﬁrms, a factor we think is important to control for in our analysis, for
reasons mentioned previously.
The values of the HRM variables indicate a relatively high rate of
employee and management involvement in the safety efforts of the ﬁrm.
The Management Safety Culture variable (MGTCULT) in Table 3.1 provides an index of management’s relative involvement in the company’s
safety programs; the mean score of 23.01 indicates a relatively high
level of management involvement in safety among these ﬁrms. Information Sharing (INFOSHR), another index, is created from six variables
indicating the extent of information sharing with employees in several
dimensions of ﬁrm activity: investments, production, human resource
planning, proﬁtability, corporate ﬁnance, and workplace safety. A score
of 5 in each of these six dimensions indicates complete sharing; a score
of 1 indicates no information sharing. The highest possible level of in-
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formation sharing, then, would receive a score of 30; the lowest, a score
of 5. The mean score of about 19 indicates that management shares a
signiﬁcant amount of information but not all of it.
Employee Participation in Decision Making (EPDM) is the sum of
eight dummy variables indicating whether the ﬁrm allows employee
participation in the following decision-making activities: suggestion
system, quality circles, self-managing work teams, joint labor-management committees, quality of work life program, total quality management program, job redesign, and employee representation on the board
of directors. The mean score of 2.63 indicates that the average ﬁrm in
this part of the analysis uses less than three of these eight HR decisionmaking practices. Employee Participation in Decision Making (EPDM)
indicates the breadth of decision-making activities that workers participate in, and Intensity of Employee Participation (EPDEG) indicates the
depth. The mean score of 8.01 indicates that workers are reported to
participate rather intensely in those decision-making activities they are
involved with. So while workers are not involved in many strategic decision-making activities, they participate intensely in the few in which
they are involved.
Similar to Employee Participation in Decision Making, Employee
Participation in Financial Returns (EPFR) is the sum of 10 dummy variables indicating whether the ﬁrm allows employees to participate in
the following: individual incentive plan, cash proﬁt-sharing plan, gain
sharing, pension plan, stock purchase plan, employee stock ownership
plan, deferred proﬁt-sharing plan, skill-based pay, 401(k) plan, and
group bonus plan. The mean score of 2.125 indicates that, on average,
the ﬁrms in the frequency analysis offer only two of these 10 options to
participate in the ﬁnancial returns of the ﬁrm.
Given the results cited in the literature above, our expectations are
that higher values of these HRM variables will generally lower claim
frequency. Which HRM practices actually do lower claim frequency,
and by how much, is an empirical issue addressed in Table 3.2.
Since the results in the left-hand column of Table 3.2 come from a
linear probability model, they are readily interpreted as the change in
the probability of an injury given a unit change in the corresponding regressors. (Since the speciﬁcations in the center and right-hand columns
involve injury severity measures rather than injury frequency, they will
be discussed below.) For example, unionized workplaces have a 4 per-
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Variable

Deﬁnition

Mean

Std. dev.

0.060
0.784
18.616

0.256
1.992
31.425

A dummy variable coded 1 if the claimant’s company experienced layoffs or cutbacks in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise

0.326

0.470

EPDM

Number of employee participation programs in decisionmaking process

2.631

1.473

EPFR

Number of employee participation programs in the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial returns

2.125

1.211

MGTCULT

Score of management’s commitment to workplace safety
Score of the degree of employee participation in the
company’s decision-making process

23.011
8.011

2.896
1.256

Score of the degree to which management shares information
with employees on production issues

18.895

5.079

Dependent variables
(Injury incidence rate)
INJSEV1 (Injury severity rate 1)
INJSEV2 (Injury severity rate 2)
INJINC

Number of workers’ compensation claims per employee
Number of lost workdays per employee
Number of lost workdays per injury

Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables

EPDEG

INFOSHR
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Control variables
UNION

PCTWOMEN
PCTAGE

(25–54)

PCTPROD

A dummy variable coded 1 if the workplace is unionized,
0 otherwise
Percentage of women employees
Percentage of employees aged 25–54
Percentage of production employees

0.745

0.437

47.654
68.307
73.396

34.647
15.800
17.230

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Variable
Constant
Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables
EPDM
EPFR
MGTCULT
EPDEG
INFOSHR

Dependent variable: Number
of workers’ compensation
claims per employee

Dependent variable:
Average lost
workdays per employee

0.304**
(0.141)

1.044
(2.883)

−50.065
(40.872)

−0.032**
(0.019)

−0.072
(0.390)

3.753
(3.795)

−0.012**
(0.006)
−0.014***
(0.006)
−0.012*
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.007)
0.005**
(0.003)

−0.119
(0.149)
−0.203**
(0.115)
−0.010
(0.165)
−0.312**
(0.163)
−0.021
(0.097)

−1.017
(2.428)
−2.154*
(1.461)
3.012*
(2.052)
3.151*
(2.111)
−0.813
(1.588)

Dependent variable:
Average lost
workdays per injury
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Control variables
UNION
PCTWOMEN
PCTAGE

(25–54)

PCTPROD

Year dummies
Industry dummies

yes
yes
2.608***
78

0.017
(0.459)
−0.020
(0.013)
−0.029
(0.019)
0.017
(0.011)

10.603*
(6.785)
−0.031
(0.131)
−0.508*
(0.321)
0.270**
(0.134)

yes
yes

yes
yes

1.007
78

0.769
54

NOTE: Estimated heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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F value
n

−0.040***
(0.017)
−0.002***
(0.0007)
0.0001
(0.0006)
0.0009*
(0.0006)
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centage point lower frequency of injuries than nonunion workplaces.
A 10 percentage point increase in the number of production employees
results in a 0.9 percentage point increase in the injury rate. An increase
in the injury rate accompanying the addition of more production employees is expected, as production employees engage in riskier work
activities than managerial workers. The union effect is more difﬁcult
to interpret: unions tend to enforce safety standards at work more than
nonunion workplaces, which would explain why unions might decrease
the injury rate. However, unions tend to form at worksites that are intrinsically more dangerous, so on the basis of sample selection one
might expect a positive coefﬁcient here.
The strongest effect among the control variables, however, is that
of female workers. Nearly half of the workers in our frequency are female employees (47.65 percent). Our results suggest that increasing the
number of females by 10 percentage points (to 57.65 percent) would
decrease the injury rate by 2 percentage points. An increase of one full
standard deviation in the percentage of female workers (that is, an increase of 34.6 percentage points) would decrease the injury rate by 7
percentage points.
The negative coefﬁcient on the Downsizing dummy variable (DOWNSIZE) suggests that sample selection and moral hazard mitigate the filing of additional claims. For those already on a lost-time claim, the
effect of downsizing is to increase claim duration (as indicated by the
3.75 coefﬁcient in the right-hand column of Table 3.2 for aggregated
ﬁrm results and the positive Downsizing coefﬁcients in Table 3.4 for
individual claimant data). However, while claim duration increases for
extant claims, claim frequency falls in those ﬁrms experiencing layoffs:
either downsizing selectivity retains those workers least likely to ﬁle a
claim (sample selection), or workers won’t ﬁle claims for fear of being
included in the next round of layoffs (i.e., there is a moral hazard that
lowers the ﬁrm’s safety costs). However, the downsizing effect is relatively small: downsized ﬁrms have only a 3.2 percentage point lower
rate of injury than ﬁrms that have not downsized, though the difference
appears to be signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Because HRM variables are our central focus in the analysis, we discuss those results from two different perspectives. The ﬁrst is the standard regression interpretation of the estimated coefﬁcients, reﬂecting
the percentage change in injury rates given a unit increase in the value
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of the respective HRM practice. For example, a one-unit increase in Information Sharing increases claims by 0.5 percentage points, as shown
in Table 3.2 in the left-hand column. However, because HRM variables
are constructed as sums of dummy variables, one cannot always intuit
what a unit increase means in terms of HRM practice. Therefore we
also report the effects of the HRM variables from a high-HRM-use perspective, looking at the change from the usual values for HRM to the
values of the respective HRM variables employed by the top 16 percent
of ﬁrms (thus only about one-sixth of the ﬁrms have this level of HRM
practice). This high HRM use is the level of HRM practice that lies one
standard deviation above the mean. Hence, the claim frequency is 2.5
percentage points higher at the high-HRM-use level than at the average
level, because a standard deviation increase in the value of information
sharing from 20 to 25 percentage points increases claim frequency by
2.5 percentage points (5 × 0.005).
The human resource management practice variables in the left-hand
column of Table 3.2 generally have the expected signs, including statistically signiﬁcant impacts on the claim rate. The intensity of worker
involvement (EPDEG) does not affect claim frequency (the − 0.002 coefﬁcient is statistically insigniﬁcant).1 More information sharing seems
to increase the injury rate, as discussed in the last paragraph. Adding
another program to involve employees in the ﬁrm’s decision making
(increasing EPDM by one unit) lowers the injury rate by 1.2 percentage points. Increasing the ways that employees share in the company’s
ﬁnancial returns (EPFR) by one more program lowers the injury rate by
1.4 percentage points, and adding one more dimension to management
safety culture (MGTCULT) also lowers the injury rate by 1.2 percentage
points.
While Employee Participation in Decision Making, Employee Participation in Financial Returns, and Management Safety Culture all have
roughly the same estimated coefﬁcient, Management Safety Culture’s
inﬂuence is nearly twice as great when measured on a high-HRM-use
perspective because variation in management safety culture is so much
greater than variation in employee participation: in Table 3.1, the Management Safety Culture standard deviation is nearly twice as great as
that of the employee participation variable EPDM and more than twice as
great as that of EPFR. Hence, while the move to a high-HRM-use level
would lower the injury rate by 1.7 percentage points for either of the
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employee participation variables, the move to a high-HRM-use level
for Management Safety Culture would lower the injury claim rate by
3.5 percentage points. Finally, the move to a high-HRM-use level in
the intensity of employee involvement in decision making (EPDEG) decreases the injury claims rate by 0.3 percentage points.
With the exception of Hunt et al. (1993), there are no studies of
the impact of HR practices on claim frequency. Hunt et al. (1993) analyze survey results for 220 medium and large ﬁrms in Michigan and
link their safety practices to their claim ﬁling rates and measures of
claim severity. Their safety diligence, safety training, proactive returnto-work program, and active safety leadership factors (which overlap
our Management Safety Culture variable) are negatively correlated
with their lost-workday case rate and with the workers’ compensation
claim rate in multivariate regressions and are generally statistically signiﬁcant. Their sample sizes vary between 187 and 161, depending on
speciﬁcation. In the workers’ compensation speciﬁcation, Hunt et al.
(1993) ﬁnd that ﬁrm-size dummy variables are not usually statistically
signiﬁcant but that industry dummy variables are. They also report a
regression, with aggregate, average lost workdays per case as the dependent variable, in which they ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant effects
of safety practices on claim severity.
In the next section we examine the duration of individual claims for
a larger number of claims than Hunt et al. (1993) had available, using
individual claimant data from the Minnesota Department of Labor and
Industry.
CLAIM DURATION RESULTS
Aggregate data: Table 3.2 revisited. While the most credible
information on claim duration comes from the analysis of individual
claim durations in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the middle and right columns in
Table 3.2 provide some alternative estimates on how HRM policies affect claim duration. The middle column of Table 3.2 corresponds most
closely to the expected cost analysis given in Table 3.6, below, but is not
always consistent with those results: increases in Employee Participation in Decision Making, Employee Participation in Financial Returns,
and Management Safety Culture reduce expected losses, as they do in
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Table 3.6, but the Management Safety Culture effect is relatively small
and statistically insigniﬁcant, unlike the Management Safety Culture
effect of Table 3.6. Moreover, increases in Intensity of Employee Participation or in Information Sharing lower expected costs in Table 3.2’s
middle column but have a positive effect in Table 3.6.
A speciﬁcation that is most like the duration speciﬁcation of this
section is the right column of Table 3.2: they both model the duration
of injuries, though the empirical results differ somewhat. Increases in
Employee Participation in Financial Returns and in Information Sharing are found to be linked to lower claim durations in Table 3.2, as they
are in the results reported in Table 3.4 below. Intensity of Employee
Participation has the same positive impact on duration in Table 3.2 as it
does in Table 3.4. However, Management Safety Culture and Employee
Participation in Decision Making have the opposite signs, though the
Employee Participation in Decision Making variable is statistically insigniﬁcant in both speciﬁcations.
The estimated effect of Management Safety Culture on claim duration is 10 times larger in Table 3.4 than it is in Table 3.2, perhaps
because those tables represent a slightly different sample of ﬁrms, or
perhaps because the measure of claim duration is slightly different.
The sample in Table 3.2, as previously noted in the discussion of the
descriptive statistics, is limited to those reporting a full set of control
variables (union or nonunion, percentage women, percentage young,
percentage production employees). Thus there is a smaller sample of
ﬁrms contributing to the estimates in Table 3.2 than in Table 3.4. However, we doubt, given the approximate similarity in their sample means,
that this explains the differential response.
A more likely explanation of the difference in results is that claim
duration is measured differently. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc OSHA data (reported to the U.S. Department of Labor) in the far right-hand column of
Table 3.2 include workers whose injury duration is shorter than three
days, whereas the data in Table 3.4 exclude those who don’t satisfy
the three-day waiting period. In workers’ compensation, claims with a
duration of less than the waiting period are called medical-only claims.
Appel and Borba (1988) report that the medical-only category accounts
for 81 percent of all claims, although it accounts for less than 6 percent
of total costs. If Management Safety Culture successfully reduced longduration claims while encouraging the reporting of short-term injury in-
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cidents (which included medical-only workers’ compensation claims),
then this would explain both results: few long-duration claims occur as
Management Safety Culture increases (Table 3.4), but more diligent reporting and monitoring of minor injuries does occur (Table 3.2). Unfortunately, the Minnesota data do not record information on medical-only
claims, so pursuit of this hypothesis (claims shifting as Management
Safety Culture changes) will have to wait for future research.
Individual claim data: Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The descriptive statistics for the duration analysis given in Table 3.3 indicate that the mean
duration of workers’ compensation claims among claimants with some
lost-time workdays is 55.78 days.2 However, 20 percent of these are
right-censored (and were still in progress when we drew our sample
of claims), hence the 55.78 days is an underestimate of the average
completed spell of workers’ compensation. Some claims, often those
of longer duration, will still be in progress when information about the
claims is gathered. If a claim has been in progress for two weeks, for example, when the sample of claims is drawn, we cannot be sure whether
the ﬁnal duration of the in-progress claim will be 15 days, 15 weeks, or
even 15 months. We only know that the duration is at least two weeks
long. If the duration of this in-progress spell is recorded as “2 weeks,”
we underestimate the ﬁnal duration and bias the results. If the in-progress spells are thrown out, we tend to bias the estimates again, as these
claims will tend to be of longer duration. Maximum likelihood estimation allows us to include these in-progress spells while accounting for
the right-censoring in a way that doesn’t lead to biased estimates. The
maximum likelihood estimates, employing a Weibull duration model
(McDonald and Butler 1990), are reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
The values of the variables for employee participation and management culture in Table 3.3 indicate a relatively high rate of employee
and management involvement in the safety efforts of the ﬁrm and are
very similar to those reported in Table 3.1. The differences between
the statistics in Table 3.1 and those in Table 3.3 stem from the weights
given to different ﬁrms: in Table 3.1, each ﬁrm receives equal weight in
determining the mean; in Table 3.3, the larger ﬁrms have more claims
and so implicitly get greater weight than they do in Table 3.1. The main
difference in the Employee Participation in Decision Making, Employee Participation in Financial Returns, and Information Sharing variable
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averages—all of which are more representative of the larger ﬁrms—is
that HRM variables in the claim duration speciﬁcation have slightly
higher values in Table 3.3 than these same variables have in the claim
frequency sample in Table 3.1. Given the results cited in the literature
above, our expectations are that higher values of these HRM culture
variables will lower claim duration. Which ones, and by how much, is
an empirical issue addressed in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, where we employ
maximum likelihood to estimate the duration of workers’ compensation
claims.
We generally ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant effects, of the expected
sign, in the duration models. While we do not report the estimated shape
parameters of the Weibull distribution in Tables 3.4 or 3.5, they indicate
negative duration dependence: as claim duration increases, the rate of
exit from claimant status falls. Hence, the longer a claimant stays on a
workers’ compensation claim, the less likely he is to leave it.
The demographic variables in the Weibull regressions of Tables 3.4
and 3.5 have their expected effect. For example, a 10 percent increase
in the age of a claimant increases the expected claim duration by 7
percent when there are no controls for industry, occupation, and injury,
and it increases the expected claim duration by 4 percent when such
controls are present (see the right-hand column coefﬁcient for age).3
This is the same sign, but twice the magnitude, of the age elasticity
reported by Butler and Worrall (1985). The replacement rate elasticity
is also higher here than that reported in Butler and Worrall (1985) but is
within the range generally found in empirical research (Butler, Gardner,
and Gardner 1997). In our Minnesota sample, a 10 percent increase in
beneﬁts (holding wages constant) increases the expected claim duration
by about 5 percent (the right-hand column in Table 3.4). We ﬁnd no
gender differences in duration, nor do we ﬁnd a self-insurance effect
once industry and occupation are held constant.
The empirical ﬁndings in Table 3.4 also show Downsizing and HRM
effects of the expected sign. If the ﬁrm has downsized its workforce in
the last 12 months, then claim duration is 20 percent higher than it would
be without any recent downsizing. These results are consistent with earlier ﬁndings that workers’ compensation costs increase in environments
where there is greater employment uncertainty. This ﬁnding is important since it is the ﬁrst time that ﬁrm-speciﬁc downsizing information
(as opposed to individual employment status or local unemployment in-
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Variable

Deﬁnition

Mean

Std. dev.

55.78

140.91

0.20

0.40

A dummy variable coded 1 if the claimant’s company experienced layoffs
or cutbacks in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise

0.40

0.49

EPDM

Number of employee participation programs in decision-making process

3.12

1.36

EPFR

Number of employee participation programs in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns

3.08

2.16

MGTCULT

Score of management’s commitment to workplace safety

22.62

2.29

EPDEG

Score of the degree of employee participation in company’s decision-making
process
Score of the degree to which management shares information with
employees on production issues

8.12

1.00

20.26

5.24

Dependent variables
NWSPELL
DENIAL

Duration of nonwork spell: days of temporary total disability beneﬁts paid
in workers’ compensation systema
A dummy variable coded 1 if claim was denied for liability by insurer,
0 otherwise

Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables

INFOSHR
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Claimant characteristics
MALE

A dummy variable coded 1 if claimant is male, 0 if female

LnAGE

Log of age of claimant at time of injury

LnRRATE

Log of wage replacement rate in Minnesota workers’ compensation systemc

SELF

A dummy variable coded 1 if claimant’s company is self-insured for its
workers’ compensation coverage

0.53

0.50

3.63
(39.47)b
4.28
(73.40)b
0.29

0.31
(11.54)b
0.19
(14.41)b
0.45

The dependent variable NWSPELL is transformed into logarithmic form in the LIFEREG function of SAS.
Descriptive statistics of variables without taking logs.
c
Real-wage replacement rate was used to capture both wage and expected workers’ compensation beneﬁt effects on the dependent
variable. In accordance with the Minnesota workers’ compensation law, RATE was calculated by the following formula (Minnesota WC
income beneﬁt schedule used; 1992 analysis of workers’ compensation laws, U.S. Chamber of Commerce):
RATE = MAXt / Wage
if (Wage × 0.66) ≥ MAXt
0.66
if [MINt ≤ (Wage × 0.66) < MAXt]
MINt / Wage
if [(MINt × 0.66) ≤ (Wage × 0.66) < MINt]
1 otherwise,
where Wage is average production employee’s gross weekly wage, MAXt is maximum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota
workers’ compensation system, and MINt is minimum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota workers’ compensation system.
(In the analysis of this study, log of RATE × 100 was included in the models as RRATE.)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
a

b
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Table 3.4 Weibull Estimates of the Duration of Nonwork Spells in the
Workers’ Compensation System: The Direct Effects Model
(standard error in parentheses)
Dependent variable: log of nonwork spell in
Minnesota workers’ compensation system
Variable
Constant
Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables
EPDM
EPFR
MGTCULT
EPDEG
INFOSHR

Claimant characteristics
MALE
LnAGE
LnRRATE
SELF

Control variables
Industry dummies
Injury type dummies
Occupation dummies
Year dummies

Butler&Park.indb 50

Model (1)
2.96**
(1.25)

Model (2)
4.02***
(1.46)

0.25***
(0.09)

0.21**
(0.10)

0.05
(0.03)
−0.13***
(0.04)
−0.14***
(0.03)
0.20***
(0.06)
−0.05***
(0.01)

0.06
(0.04)
−0.13***
(0.05)
−0.15***
(0.04)
0.19***
(0.07)
−0.06***
(0.01)

0.03
(0.08)
0.69***
(0.12)
0.34
(0.23)
−0.41***
(0.09)

−0.13
(0.09)
0.41***
(0.13)
0.53*
(0.28)
0.04
(0.12)

no
no
no
no

yes
yes
yes
yes
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Log likelihood for Weibull
n

Model (1)

Model (2)

−3057.40
1906

−2655.01
1732

NOTE: * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
(two-tailed test); *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 3.5 Weibull Estimates of the Duration of Nonwork Spells in the
Workers’ Compensation System: The Indirect Effects Model
(standard error in parentheses)
Dependent variable: log of nonwork
spell in the Minnesota workers’
compensation system
Variable

Model (1)

Model (2)

Constant

3.41***
(1.31)

5.13***
(1.55)

−.77
(1.68)

−.19
(1.80)

.03
(.04)
−.04
(.06)
−.17***
(.05)
.19**
(.08)
−.05***
(.01)

.005
(.05)
.06
(.07)
−.20***
(.05)
.15
(.09)
−.04***
(.01)

.07
(.07)
−.13
(.08)
.04
(.08)
.01
(.11)
.003
(.02)
−.34
(.21)

.14*
(.08)
−.28***
(.10)
.02
(.08)
.08
(.13)
−.02
(.02)
−.25
(.24)

Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables
EPDM
EPFR
MGTCULT
EPDEG
INFOSHR

HRM × Downsizing interactions
EPDM × DOWNSIZE
EPFR

× DOWNSIZE

MGTCULT
EPDEG

× DOWNSIZE

INFOSHR
SELF
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Table 3.5 (continued)
Dependent variable: log of nonwork
spell in the Minnesota workers’
compensation system
Variable
Claimant characteristics
MALE
LnAGE
LnRRATE
SELF

Control variables
Industry dummies
Injury type dummies
Occupation dummies
Year dummies
Log likelihood for Weibull
n

Model (1)

Model (2)

−.01
(.08)
.67***
(.12)
.38
(.23)
.028
(.04)

−.15
(.09)
.41***
(.13)
.43
(.28)
.12
(.13)

no
no
no
no

yes
yes
yes
yes

−3,054.20
1,906

−2,646.97
1,732

NOTE: * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
(two-tailed test); *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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surance rates) has been used in an analysis of individual claim duration.
The Downsizing effect is not only large in magnitude but statistically
signiﬁcant as well. Our results suggest that the tendency for workers’
compensation costs to increase during downsizing operates through a
claim duration effect rather than through a claims ﬁling effect.
All of the HRM variables except Employee Participation in Decision Making (EPDM) also signiﬁcantly reduce claim duration, and they
generally have larger estimated effects on claim duration than they do
on claim frequency. Even though the number of decision-making activities does not affect claim duration, the intensity of participation does. A
standard deviation increase in the intensity of employees’ involvement,
creating a jump to the high-HRM-use level, increases claim duration by
20 percent. (Recall that Intensity of Employee Participation is the sum
of two Likert scores indicating to what degree workers feel as though
they “always” have control over their job tasks and whether they “always” participate in employee involvement programs.) The greater the
level of intensity of employee involvement, the higher the safety costs.
Our guess is that as workers become more involved in making and disseminating company safety policy, they are able to reduce the number
of shorter, less serious injury claims more than they reduce the number
of longer claims. This changes the mix of claims observed, increasing
the observed duration of the remaining claims. If this were the only factor operating, however, the frequency effects would outweigh the duration effects, and overall costs per employee would fall as information
sharing increased. We shall see that this is not the case. Other factors
must be involved—future research will likely shed more light on this
interesting result. One possibility is that as more information is shared
in the company, workers are more willing to provide information on
their workplace injuries, including minor injuries not involving signiﬁcant loss of work time claims. Another possibility, which we ﬁnd less
plausible, is endogeneity bias: ﬁrms are more willing to share information in situations where risk is greatest.
We again report the effects of the HRM variables from the highHRM-use perspective, looking at the change from the average HRM
practice to the top 16 percent of high-HRM-use ﬁrms. From this perspective, if the number of ﬁnancial returns programs (such as proﬁt
sharing) increases by a standard deviation by going from three such
programs (the average) to ﬁve (the high-use level in our sample), then
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claim duration falls by 26 percent. High-use implementation in Information Sharing, which for our sample means going from an index score
of 20 to 25, decreases claim duration by 30 percent. The greater the
workers’ ﬁnancial interest in their ﬁrm, the lower their claim durations
will be, on average. This reinforces the reducing effect that participation in ﬁnancial returns has on claim frequency.
Finally, it appears that those managers most involved in their company’s safety efforts achieve the greatest decline in the duration of their
employees’ claims. When an average ﬁrm employs high-use HRM practices—equivalent to a standard deviation increase in the Management
Safety Culture index, from about 23 to 25—claim duration decreases
by 30 percent. This is a large effect, and it reinforces the management
safety effect on claim frequency. This is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Hunt et al. (1993).
These large magnitudes indicate a substantial direct impact of HRM
practices on claim duration. Since the research cited above, as well as
anecdotal evidence from the insurance industry, indicates that downsizing and employment cycles have a signiﬁcant impact on claims ﬁling, we also examine, in Table 3.5, whether there are indirect effects of
HRM practices that operate through a reduction in the Downsizing variable. We measure this indirect effect by adding interactions between
downsizing and HRM practices to the analysis.
In general, there is little evidence of such indirect effects. In Table
3.5, only the ﬁnancial returns interaction in the right-hand column is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level; all of the other interactions
are insigniﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Taken as a group, the interactions
in the left-hand column of Table 3.5 are statistically insigniﬁcant when
using a likelihood ratio test, and the ones in the right-hand column are
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level but not at the 1 percent level.
Hence, with the single exception of the Financial Returns × Downsizing interaction, the effects of HRM practices on claim duration are
direct effects and do not seem to ameliorate the impact of downsizing
on costs. The estimated negative effect of Financial Returns × Downsizing on claim duration indicates that when employees participate in
the ﬁnancial success of a company, they tend to ﬁle claims of shorter
duration in the face of downsizing efforts, as would be expected. However, better HRM practices in other dimensions (Information Sharing,
Management Safety Culture, and Employee Participation in Decision
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Making) do not seem to mitigate the effect that Downsizing has on an
increase in claim duration. It may well be that those who perceive that
they are going to be downsized are no longer concerned about their participation in HRM practices, or about gaining information about those
practices, because they see them as largely irrelevant. If they are no
longer employed in that ﬁrm, ﬁrm outcome matters less to them.
COST IMPLICATIONS OF THE FREQUENCY AND
DURATION ESTIMATES
Since expected indemnity costs per worker are simply the product
of claim frequency, of claim duration (in weeks), and of the legislated
beneﬁts, we can examine whether safety programs operate through a
loss prevention (frequency) effect or a loss reduction (duration) effect.
Our results are summarized in Table 3.6. In our sample, the average
indemnity cost (the amount paid to injured employees for lost wages)
per injury was $175.50.4 This average annual indemnity cost per employee can be calculated by taking the product of the number of claims
per employee times the average duration (in weeks) per claim times the
average statutory weekly beneﬁt. To calculate the impact of a particular
HRM practice variable (say, the effect of Employee Participation in
Financial Returns, or EPFR) on annual indemnity cost per employee, we
take the derivative of costs (in natural logarithm terms) with respect to
that variable:
(3.1)

∂ln(Cost) ∂ln(Frequency) ∂ln(Duration) ∂ln(Beneﬁt)
=
+
+
∂ EPFR
∂ EPFR
∂ EPFR
∂ EPFR

On the right-hand side of the above equation, the ﬁrst term represents the percentage change in injury frequency relative to a unit change
in the Employee Participation in Financial Returns index; it equals the
estimated linear probability coefﬁcient in Table 3.2 divided by the average probability of a claim. This is given in the left-hand column of Table
3.6. The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (3.1) represents
the percentage change in injury duration relative to a unit change in the
Employee Participation in Financial Returns index. It equals the estimated regression coefﬁcient from the survival analysis for the duration
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Table 3.6 Safety Cost Implications of Lost-Time Pay in Workers’
Compensation When Adopting Various Human Resource
Practices

Impact
on claim
frequency (%)

Impact
on claim
duration (%)

Overall impact
on indemnity
costs (%)

Indemnity cost
change per
employee ($)
(per std. dev.
change)

EPDM

−20

6

−14

−24.57 (−36.19)

EPFR

−23

−13

−36

−63.18 (−76.51)

MGTCULT

−20

−15

−35

−61.43 (−177.89)

−3

19

16

28.08 (35.27)

8

−6

2

3.51 (17.83)

HR practice

EPDEG
INFOSHR

NOTE: Based on 1996 average lost-time workers’ compensation costs per employee
of $175.50 in our sample (12 percent of claims were still open).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

model results given in Table 3.4. These coefﬁcients are reproduced in
the second column in Table 3.6. The third term on the right-hand side of
Equation (3.1) captures the inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s Employee Participation
in Financial Returns index on statewide statutory beneﬁts. This effect
is probably close to zero since there is no reason a change in employee
involvement in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns—or any other HRM practice—should change the legislated beneﬁt level.5
The overall change in indemnity costs can be approximated by multiplying the percentage change in the indemnity costs shown in the two
left-hand columns of Table 3.6 (and summed in the third column) by
the average indemnity cost in this sample, $175.50. This calculation
is made in the far right-hand column of Table 3.6, both for a one-unit
change in each of the HRM indices and also (in parentheses) for a onestandard-deviation change in HRM indices, indicating a movement to
the high-HRM-use practice level.
As an example, if a ﬁrm were to go from using two to using three ﬁnancial returns programs (Employee Participation in Financial Returns
went from 2 to 3), then claim frequency would fall by 23 percent and
claim duration would fall by 13 percent. Lost work-time beneﬁt costs
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would fall by 36 percent (the combined impact of frequency and duration outcomes), which when multiplied by the average indemnity cost
per employee of $175.50 yields a cost reduction in lost-time expenses
of $63.18 per employee per year. This is the approximate reduction in
per-employee costs that is achieved by adding another plan in which the
employee shares in the ﬁnancial returns of the company. If the employer were to add 1.211 more programs (that is, add one standard deviation
more to Employee Participation in Financial Returns programs—Table
3.1) to the ﬁrm’s current offerings, then costs would fall by 1.211 ×
$63.18, or by $76.51. A standard deviation increase is equivalent to
moving from the average HRM offering (an HRM offering as good as
about half of the ﬁrms) to an HRM offering that is in the top 16 percent
of the ﬁrms.
Management Safety Culture is the HRM practice with the largest
cost savings per employee. A ﬁrm that increases its level of involvement so that the Management Safety Culture variable goes up by 3—or
increases by more than 10 percent and comes up into the high-HRMuse level—saves about $180 per year per employee. In a ﬁrm with 100
employees, this is an annual savings of $18,000 in lost-time pay alone.
This is likely a lower bound on the beneﬁts derived from improving
management safety culture. Medical costs will be saved in addition to
the lost-time pay costs; lost workdays will be eliminated and speciﬁc
human capital thereby retained; and employees’ level of job satisfaction may increase as well. There is a lot of variation in the value of this
variable in our sample, as one can see by looking at the large standard
deviation values in Tables 3.1 and 3.3. As there is a lot of variance in
Management Safety Culture, there is a lot of opportunity for ﬁrms to
lower safety costs by becoming more involved with work safety.6 If, in
a 100-employee ﬁrm, it costs less than $18,000 to become more concerned with safety processes and outcomes, then it is clearly advantageous for the ﬁrm to do so.
It is worthwhile to reemphasize that our estimate of the reduction
in workers’ compensation costs from engaging in these HRM practices is probably a lower bound estimate of the potential beneﬁts. To the
extent that the workplace is safer, either because physical risks have
been reduced or because workers are taking more appropriate safety
precautions, then some other accident costs are likely to be reduced as
well. Uncompensated wage loss and pain and suffering associated with
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injuries will decrease, reducing the compensating wages paid to workers. Perhaps equally important in our highly skilled labor market, more
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital can be retained as the number of days out
due to injury falls.

Notes
1.

does appear to be associated with greater claim severity (the signiﬁcant
coefficients in the center and right columns). An increase in EPDEG also is
estimated to increase claim duration in the individual claimant analysis in Table
3.4, as we will show shortly.
The models in Table 3.2 were estimated using three-year averages (the most
current three years of data) rather than using cross-section/time-series analysis,
as was employed in Table 3.2. The resulting coefﬁcients were nearly quantitatively identical to those reported in Table 3.2.
We also estimated the models in Table 3.2 by including ﬁrm size as a regressor. It was statistically signiﬁcant and negative in the left and center speciﬁcations
of Table 3.2; its inclusion did not change any of the signs of the other regressors
but did increase the magnitude of the MGTCULT, EPDEG, and DOWNSIZE coefﬁcients,
while slightly reducing the coefﬁcients for EPDM, EPFR, and INFOSHR. We exclude
it from our preferred estimation because of concern for potential endogeneity in
the model (since ﬁrm size is also in the denominator of the dependent variable).
Finally, interactions in the claim frequency reported below between the
DOWNSIZE dummy variable and HRM practices were statistically insignificant
(partially, of course, because of the small sample sizes).
The statistics here pertain to the larger claims denial regression sample. However, the smaller duration sample has mean statistics (for the independent variables)
very close to those reported in Table 3.1.
There were seven occupational-dummy variables, seven year-dummy variables,
and eight industry-dummy variables included in the model. There were also
dummy variables for the following injury types: back sprain and strain, other
sprains and strains, fractures, contusions and concussions, and lacerations.
$175.50 was the average in 1996 for our sample. 1998 and 1997 data were judged
to have too many open claims to be used as a measure of costs per worker: 1998
had 52 percent of claims still open, while 1997 had 45 percent of claims still
open. For 1996, only 12.6 percent of claims were open. We didn’t use earlier
years (with still fewer open claims) because of a concern that they might be less
relevant for the survey results and because of cost-of-living differences.
The expected weekly beneﬁt depends on the legislated maximum and minimum
beneﬁts, the replacement rate (these three beneﬁt parameters are determined by
the individual state legislatures), and the worker’s wage rate. Since maximum
beneﬁt payments are low enough that most workers are constrained by the maximum weekly beneﬁt, a change in any HR practice won’t affect the beneﬁt they
EPDEG
EPDEG

2.
3.

4.

5.
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receive—they will get the legislated maximum payment. However, workers below the maximum may have their beneﬁts indirectly affected by the HR practices
that are adopted if they value those practices. Workers who value the work environment generated by some of these HR practices, and whose weekly beneﬁt
would be below the maximum legislated beneﬁt level, will take an implicit wage
reduction because of the valued HR practices. Furthermore, because of the wage
reduction, they will have their beneﬁts indirectly affected by the presence of the
HR practice. The size of the implied wage reductions necessary to fund the HR
practices considered would not be enough to substantially alter the conclusions
in Table 3.6. The greatest wage reductions, for example, would be for employer’s
share of proﬁt sharing (or, perhaps, health and pension contributions). If this
leads to a 3 percent reduction in wages, expected beneﬁts would fall (for those
between the minimum and maximum beneﬁt levels) by 2 percent. Such a change
is dwarfed by the changes given in Table 3.4. Finally, even if these changes are
more substantial than we anticipate, note that they work to reinforce the conclusions drawn concerning the outcomes in Table 3.4, as they tend to further reduce
workers’ compensation costs.
6. Hunt et al. (1993) reach similar conclusions. In their survey, active safety leadership, safety diligence, proactive RTW program, and safety training proxy some
of the same dimensions that we have included under Management Safety Culture. In their study, they also ﬁnd that these are effective mechanisms through
which to promote health and safety, and their empirical data suggest that there
is also a relative abundance of variation in these practices across their sample of
relatively large ﬁrms (Hunt et al. 1993, Table 4.2).
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4
Reduced Moral Hazard
or Increased Efﬁciency?
Evidence from Claim Types and Claim Denials

The distinction made between the direct and indirect effects of
HRM practices in the last chapter is not only intrinsically interesting, it
suggests that HRM practices do not simply reduce claims-reporting risk
(a change in the reporting of claims, even where real risk is held constant) but rather reduce real risk (through lowering the degree of intrinsic physical risk of employee risk-taking behavior). In Chapter 1 we argued that HRM practices may change real risk by more fully involving
employees in the ﬁrm’s strategic decision making or ﬁnancial returns.
Either of these measures increases employees’ incentives to design and
implement safety policies that improve workplace efﬁciency or at least
help reduce impediments to the ﬂow of information about safety risks
between the ﬁrm and the employees. We explore this intriguing possibility further in this chapter by examining how HRM policies affect
claim denials and the distribution of injury risks.
CLAIMS-REPORTING AND RISK-BEARING MORAL
HAZARD
In the last chapter, we found that HRM practices reduce claim duration and, generally, claim frequency. However, this indicates nothing
about whether the effect represents a reduction in real risk taking or
simply a reduction in the propensity to report a claim. The former is
called risk-bearing moral hazard while the latter is known as claimsreporting moral hazard (Butler and Worrall 1991). Though either kind
of moral hazard increases an employer’s costs, the distinction between
risk-bearing and claims-reporting moral hazard has important implications for resource allocation. If changes in claim frequency and claim
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duration stem purely from the effects of reporting, without any change
in the degree of intrinsic physical risk, then we would not expect to see
changes in compensating wages for unreimbursed wage losses.1 Further, if it is a pure reporting effect, then changes in safety programs or
ergonomic standards are likely to have little impact on workers’ compensation costs. If increases in workers’ compensation costs are driven
by reporting effects, additional expenditures may be more productive
as subsidies to pension beneﬁts or wellness programs than as increases
in safety training.
The estimated direct effects in the previous chapter only indicate
that downsizing increases workers’ compensation claim duration and
that most HRM practices decrease workers’ compensation costs. These
estimates do not indicate whether the corresponding changes in workers’ compensation outcomes are a result of changes in the propensity to
report claims or a result of changes in the degree of risk-taking behavior
of workers. The propensity to report claims would be affected if participation in strategic decision making or in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns
internalized safety costs to the employee so that he made the same decisions he would make if he were spending his own money. If claimsreporting behavior were important, then as employee participation in
decision making and ﬁnancial returns increased, the impact of downsizing on claim frequency or claim duration would fall. In other words, we
would expect negative and statistically signiﬁcant interactions between
Downsizing and various HRM practices. This suggests that we may
ﬁnd some evidence on the reporting versus real risk explanations of cost
changes by examining indirect evidence—that is, evidence besides the
main HRM and Downsizing effects.
Some indirect evidence was provided in Table 3.5 of the last chapter, though it was not discussed as a test for claims-reporting moral
hazard. To test the claims-reporting versus risk-bearing explanations
using Table 3.5 coefﬁcient estimates, we have to assume either that
downsizing increases workers’ compensation claim duration because it
is a reporting effect (this is the traditional explanation in the empirical
literature) or that downsizing represents a change in real risk that is due
to job stress or job fatigue as the work pace increases. We now explore
both of these interpretations of Table 3.5.

Butler&Park.indb 62

6/22/2005 11:51:45 AM

Reduced Moral Hazard or Increased Efﬁciency? 63

Downsizing outcomes as a claims-reporting effect. In the midst
of downsizing, there are a number of reasons to suspect claims-reporting moral hazard, particularly if the claimant believes that he may be
one of those losing a job. Workers’ compensation claim status is preferred to unemployment insurance claim status for a number of reasons:
workers’ compensation beneﬁts are higher than unemployment insurance beneﬁts; workers’ compensation beneﬁts are tax-free and unemployment insurance beneﬁts are not; and workers’ other fringe beneﬁts
continue while they receive workers’ compensation beneﬁts, whereas
there are few, if any, fringe beneﬁts for unemployed workers. If the
Downsizing effect is a reporting effect, HRM practices that increase
employee involvement should mitigate these responses.
Downsizing outcomes as a risk-bearing effect. In this case, employment volatility and longer work hours associated with downsizing
would either increase the intrinsic workplace risk or induce workers to
change their risk-bearing behaviors. Downsizing would increase claim
frequency, but this impact would be mitigated in those ﬁrms with better
work safety conditions.2 Since higher values of the Management Safety
Culture variable (management’s commitment to workplace safety) indicate better safety environments, then if risk-bearing moral hazard is reﬂected in the Downsizing effect, there should be a negative interaction
between Management Safety Culture and Downsizing. Safer workplaces will reduce the risk-bearing effects associated with Downsizing.
The evidence. The Management Safety Culture × Downsizing interaction in Table 3.5 of Chapter 3 (MGTCULT × DOWNSIZE), instead of being statistically signiﬁcant and negative, is insigniﬁcant and positive, as
are many of the other HRM interactions reported in Table 3.5. The sole
exception is the Employee Participation in Financial Returns × Downsizing interaction (EPFR × DOWNSIZE). Three out of the six interactions
are positive in the preferred, right-hand speciﬁcation with the control
variables, and one of these is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level. This supports
neither the claims-reporting moral hazard nor the risk-bearing moral
hazard explanation of why downsizing increases workers’ compensation claim durations.
However, our tests for claims-reporting and risk-bearing moral hazard may suffer from speciﬁcation bias: the functional form may not
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be the correct one, or there may be omitted factors not included in the
claim duration and claim frequency regressions. So in this chapter we
present two additional tests for detecting moral hazard effects that have
been used previously in the workers’ compensation literature. We examine whether claim denial rates are affected by HRM practices, and
we examine whether the type of claims (i.e., hard-to-monitor claims
versus easy-to-monitor claims) varies with HRM practices.
If, for example, more ﬁnancial involvement in the ﬁrm reduces
claim frequency by a reduction in moral hazard, then we would expect
that more employee ﬁnancial involvement would also reduce the number of claim denials on the part of ﬁrms. Similarly, since claim-reporting moral hazard is most likely to occur in difﬁcult-to-monitor claims
such as back sprains and strains, we would expect that ﬁrms offering
more ﬁnancial rewards linked to workers’ productivity would experience relatively fewer back strain claims as the moral hazard–induced
reporting of those claims falls. We examine the empirical evidence associated with these predictions in the next two sections.
CLAIM DENIAL RESULTS
Our hypothesis is that claims seen by the insurer, or ﬁrm, as potential claims-reporting moral hazard behavior are more likely to be denied. We expect that the implementation of safety strategies and worker
involvement will ameliorate concerns over claims-reporting moral hazard. Hence, in this section we estimate the following logistic claim denial regression:
(4.1)

log

claim denial = Xβ + Mδ + Hγ + Dα
1 − claim denial

where claim denial is the probability that a given claim will be denied
by the ﬁrm, M represents Management Safety Culture, H represents
other HRM variables, D represents Downsizing, and X represents the
remaining control variables in the analysis.
The descriptive statistics for the claim denial analysis are given in
Table 4.1 and are the same as those given in Table 3.3 in the last chapter. The logistic regressions in Table 4.2 compute the likelihood that a
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workers’ compensation claim will be denied. Here we will discuss only
the results in the right-hand column since this value is the speciﬁcation
that includes the industry, occupational, injury, and year dummy variables. The difference in the speciﬁcation with and without the control
variables is modest: the coefﬁcients are generally of the same sign and
magnitude but often lose some signiﬁcance in the presence of other
control variables.
Among the claimant characteristics, only Maleness (MALE) and the
Wage Replacement Rate (LnRRATE) have significant impacts: being male
increases the likelihood of having one’s claim denied by 3.5 percentage points, and increasing the replacement rate by 10 percent increases
the likelihood of having one’s claim denied by 2.3 percentage points
(using the right-hand column estimates). This latter beneﬁts effect is
an expected moral hazard result: the higher the replacement rate, the
greater the incentive to report a claim and the more likely that it will
be denied. Downsizing in the ﬁrm also has the expected positive coefﬁcient but is statistically insigniﬁcant in either speciﬁcation in Table
4.2. The insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient for Downsizing in the claims denial
regression suggests that it may not be a good proxy for claims-reporting (or risk-bearing) moral hazard in this sample. This insigniﬁcance
also suggests that our interpretation of the interaction effects in the last
section as indicators of moral hazard response is probably not a very
discerning test.
Nonetheless, if ﬁrms perceive that there is a signiﬁcant amount of
claims-reporting moral hazard taking place, then the existence of HRM
practices that increase job satisfaction or a worker’s ﬁnancial commitment to the ﬁrm ought to be associated with lower claim denial rates
(Card and McCall 1996). That is, the HRM practice variables ought to
have negative coefﬁcients. However, the HRM coefﬁcients offer mixed
results. Only three of the ﬁve coefﬁcients are negative. Moreover, in
the preferred speciﬁcation given in the right-hand column of Table 4.2
only the ﬁnancial returns variable (EPFR) is statistically signiﬁcant at the
0.10 (but not the 0.05) level. This suggests that the reductions in claim
severity due to HRM practices are not exclusively the result of reduced
moral hazard. If they were, then more of these HRM practices would be
associated with fewer claim denials.3
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Variable

Deﬁnition

Mean

Std. dev.

Duration of nonwork spell: days of temporary total disability beneﬁts paid in
the workers’ compensation systema
DENIAL
A dummy variable coded 1 if the claim was denied for the liability by the
insurer, 0 otherwise
Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE
A dummy variable coded 1 if the claimant’s company experienced layoffs or
cutbacks in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise
HRM variables
EPDM
Number of employee participation programs in decision-making process

55.78

140.91

0.20

0.40

3.12

1.36

Number of employee participation programs in the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial returns
MGTCULT
Score of management’s commitment to workplace safety
EPDEG
Score of the degree of employee participation in the company’s decisionmaking process
INFOSHR
Score of the degree to which management shares information with employees
on the various issues in the production process
Claimant characteristics

3.08
22.62
8.12

2.16
2.29
1.00

20.26

5.24

Dependent variables
NWSPELL

EPFR
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LnAGE

A dummy variable coded 1 if claimant is male, 0 if female
Log of age of claimant at time of injury

LnRRATE

Log of wage replacement rate in Minnesota workers’ compensation systemc

SELF

A dummy variable coded 1 if claimant’s company is self-insured for its
workers’ compensation coverage

MALE

0.53
3.63
(39.47)b
4.28
(73.40)b
0.29

0.50
0.31
(11.54)b
0.19
(14.41)b
0.45

b
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Descriptive statistics of variables without taking logs.
The dependent variable NWSPELL is transformed into logarithmic form in the LIFEREG function of SAS.
c
Real wage replacement rate was used to capture both wage and expected workers’ compensation beneﬁt effects on the dependent
variable. In accordance with the Minnesota workers’ compensation law, RATE was calculated by the following formula (Minnesota WC
income beneﬁt schedule used; 1992 analysis of workers’ compensation laws, U.S. Chamber of Commerce):
RATE = MAXt / Wage
if (Wage × 0.66) ≥ MAX
0.66
if [MINt ≤ (Wage × 0.66) < MAX]
MINt / Wage
if [(MINt × 0.66) ≤ (Wage × 0.66) < MINt]
1 otherwise,
where Wage is average production employee’s gross weekly wage, MAXt is maximum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota
workers’ compensation system, and MINt is minimum amount of wage replacement through Minnesota workers’ compensation system.
(In the analysis of this study, log of RATE × 100 was included in the models as RRATE).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
a
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Table 4.2 Logit Estimates of Claim Denials in the Workers’
Compensation System (standard error in parentheses)
Dependent variable: incidence of claim denial in
the Minnesota workers’ compensation system
Variable

Model (1)

Model (2)

Constant

−8.87***
(1.49)

−8.39***
(1.78)

0.17
(0.11)

0.09
(0.13)

0.15***
(0.04)
−0.15***
(0.04)
−0.03
(0.04)
0.06
(0.07)
−0.01
(0.01)

0.09*
(0.05)
−0.10*
(0.05)
0.05
(0.05)
−0.08
(0.08)
−0.004
(0.01)

0.14
(0.10)
0.38***
(0.15)
1.45***
(0.26)
−0.49***
(0.11)

0.22*
(0.12)
0.22
(0.16)
1.55***
(0.29)
−0.26
(0.16)

Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables
EPDM
EPFR
MGTCULT
EPDEG
INFOSHR

Claimant characteristics
MALE
LnAGE
LnRRATE
SELF

Control variables
Industry dummies
Injury type dummies
Occupation dummies
Year dummies
−2 log likelihood
n

no
no
no
no

yes
yes
yes
yes

3226.74
3356

2858.64
3104

NOTE: * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
(two-tailed test); *** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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CLAIM TYPES: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ANALYSIS
If HRM practices lower moral hazard behavior, HRM practices
ought to have an impact on the type of claims that are ﬁled. If the potential for moral hazard is greatest where the costs of monitoring are
largest, then relatively more evidence of moral hazard should be seen
with respect to those types of claims that are most difﬁcult to monitor.
Again, this is especially true for sprains, strains, and cumulative trauma
conditions.
Detecting moral hazard incentives by comparing difﬁcult-to-monitor injuries with easy-to-monitor injuries was previously employed by
Smith (1990) and by Dionne and St-Michel (1991). In analyzing the
times when claims have been ﬁled, Smith raises the possibility that
workers’ compensation may be paying for some off-the-job injuries.
Smith argues that off-the-job injuries reported as work-related would
probably be difﬁcult to diagnose, relatively easy to conceal, and would
be reported early in the shift, especially on Mondays (the so-called Monday morning syndrome). He ﬁnds that of the three largest categories of
claims, sprains and strains are reported earlier in the day. Moreover, the
propensity to report sprains and strains earlier in the day is signiﬁcantly
increased on Mondays and Tuesdays following a three-day weekend.
Smith estimates that 4 percent of sprains and strains are misrepresented
as having occurred on the job. Card and McCall (1996) don’t dispute
Smith’s ﬁndings in their analysis of Minnesota data, but they discount
the moral hazard interpretation of the ﬁndings since employers did not
increase claim denials for those claims ﬁled on Monday, as would be
expected if the additional ﬁlings were related to claims-reporting moral
hazard.
Dionne and St-Michel (1991) examine moral hazard by looking at
the variation in days on workers’ compensation for those with difﬁcultto-diagnose conditions compared to those with less-difﬁcult-to-diagnose conditions. They partition injuries into two categories based on injury severity (minor injuries with fewer lost days or major injuries with
greater lost days) and whether the condition is easy or more difﬁcult to
diagnose. Like Smith (1990), they reason that moral hazard response
will be greatest for the difﬁcult-to-diagnose injuries: lower back pain
(minor injury) and spinal disorder (major injury). They ﬁnd that as Quebec’s coinsurance rates decreased in 1979, days workers spent off work

Butler&Park.indb 69

6/22/2005 11:51:46 AM

70 Butler and Park

on a difﬁcult-to-diagnose claim rose signiﬁcantly more than did days
from claims falling into the easy-to-diagnose category. They also found
that, once the interaction with diagnostic difﬁculty was controlled for,
the 1979 shift in coinsurance rates had no independent effect on days
on a claim. That is, most of the impact the declining coinsurance rates
had on days on a claim came through an increase in days consumed by
those with difﬁcult-to-diagnose injuries.
Butler, Durbin, and Helvacian (1996) use this distinction between
difﬁcult-to-monitor and easy-to-monitor injuries to explore whether
soft-tissue injury claims correlate with level of beneﬁts and spread of
HMOs. They ﬁnd in their 10-year, 15-state sample of workers’ compensation claims that the proportion of claims attributable to soft-tissue
injuries rose from 44.7 percent of all claims in 1980 to 50.6 percent in
1989. Concurrently, the share of costs attributable to soft-tissue injuries
rose from 41 percent to 48.8 percent. The share of costs for injuries that
crush or fracture a bone—easy-to-monitor claims—is the only category
that declined between 1980 and 1989. Using a multinomial logit model,
the authors determine that most of the increase in soft-tissue injury is
attributable to the expansion of HMOs. Speciﬁcally, they ascribe the
rise in such injuries to moral hazard response by HMO providers, who
increase their revenue by classifying as work-related injuries as many
health conditions as possible.4
We build on the work done by Butler, Durbin, and Helvacian (1996)
by considering whether HRM practices affect the distribution of injuries. Given prior evidence on soft-tissue sprain and strain, we would
expect to see additional HRM practices associated with fewer sprains
and strains (particularly back sprains and strains), and with relatively
more fractures and lacerations, if HRM practices are reducing workplace injuries through a claims-reporting response.
The effect of Management Safety Culture on risk-bearing moral
hazard is not as clear as the effect of other HRM practices on claimsreporting moral hazard. An increase in risk-bearing moral hazard may
increase any of the claim categories, so the change in injury types that
is attributable to a reduction in risk-bearing moral hazard is ambiguous.
Hence, the Management Safety Culture variable, which of all the HRM
variables most directly impacts the degree of risk-bearing moral hazard,
will have an ambiguous sign across the four injury groups.
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On the other hand, if HRM practices work to reduce claims-reporting moral hazard, we would expect to ﬁnd them reducing the proportion of back sprains and strains and increasing the relative number of
fractures, contusions, and cuts.
To place the ideas discussed above into a statistical framework, we
assume the typical worker experiences one of ﬁve states. The worker
may not have any type of health impairment whatsoever, or the worker
may experience some sort of injury that places him into one of four
injury categories: 1) fractures, contusions, and cuts; 2) back sprains and
strains; 3) nonback sprains and strains; and 4) all others.
Conditional on gender, age, the insurance beneﬁt replacement
rate, and whether the ﬁrm is self-insured, a probability distribution describes the likelihood of being in each of these ﬁve states.
Because of moral hazard response, the marginal worker will migrate from one state to another when there is an incentive to do so.
In particular, as ﬁnancial rewards increase through proﬁt sharing and
other forms of ﬁnancial returns, or job satisfaction increases through
greater involvement with ﬁrm decision making, then the utilitymaximizing worker is less likely to migrate to the difﬁcult-to-diagnose
(and easy-to-feign) category of back sprains and strains. The HRM effects on back sprains and strains will be negative, and the HRM effects
on fractures will be positive (or at least, more positive than they are for
lower back sprains and strains).
Since data are available only on workers who report claims, the
noninjured state is omitted. The stochastic speciﬁcation employed below implies that the parameter estimates will be unchanged by such an
omission; the odds ratio implied by a multinomial logit model maintains the independence of irrelevant alternatives, thus the parameter
estimates will be consistent.5 The categorical dependent variable identiﬁes one of the four groups of injuries above. Although the parameters
for other sprains and strains (nonback) are necessarily normalized, the
implied impact of the HRM variables on nonback sprains and strains is
given in Table 4.4.
The multinomial logit model used in this analysis assumes that the
injured worker’s perceived wellness, or utility, is given by
(4.2)
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where Wij represents ﬁnancial incentives of the worker and Sij represents nonwage dimensions of work (i.e., the worker’s involvement with
ﬁrm decision making) of worker i in claimant status j. The vector Xi
includes factors that determine ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial aspects of the
job and is assumed to be constant across claimant states. The vector of
coefﬁcients, βj , and the random error term, εij , vary by claimant status.
Note that this is a more general model than is typically employed in the
literature, where only utility in the injured versus noninjured states is
considered.
Consider the marginal worker who chooses to ﬁle a back sprain or
strain claim. The worker follows this pattern because he derives more
utility from it than from any of the other alternatives: presumably the
other claim types do not yield as much utility given the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
and nonﬁnancial dimensions, and the utility he gets while on a sprain or
strain claim (which we will denote as state “1”) is higher than it would be
if he worked (state “W,” with the other injury states labeled 2, 3, and 4).
Thus, the probability of observing a worker on a sprain or strain claim is
(4.3)

Pi1= Pr [(Ui1 > Uiw ) (Ui1 > Ui2 ) (Ui1 > Ui3 ) (Ui1 > Ui4 )]
= Pr [(Xi β1 − Xi βw > εiw − εi1 )
(Xi β1 − Xi β2 > εi2 − εi1 )
(Xi β1 − Xi β3 > εi3 − εi1 )
(Xi β1 − Xi β4 > εi4 − εi1 )] .

Similar expressions hold for the other three claimant states.
Assuming that the underlying distributions of εij are type I extremevalue-distributed, the probability of observing the ith worker in claimant status j is
(4.4)

Pij =

exp (Xi βj)
3

1 + ∑ exp (Xi βk)
k =1

(Maddala 1983).
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We deﬁne a set of four dummy variables such that
Yij = 1 if the ith worker ﬁles claim type j ;
Yij = 0 otherwise.
Then, the log-likelihood function for the model is
(4.5)

n

4

log l = ∑ ∑ Yij log Pij .
i=1 j=1

Maximizing this equation yields estimates of the parameters βj for
the three claim types relative to the omitted claim category, “All other
claims.”
Note that the coefﬁcients of the multinomial logit function do not
represent the marginal effects of the independent variables on claim
choice. However, the coefﬁcients may be converted to measures of
marginal effects and, for ease of comparison among the variables, expressed as semi-elasticities using well-established formulas:
(4.6a)

∂Pj / Pj
3
= βmj − ∑ βmk Pk
∂Pj
k=1

(4.6b)

∂Pj / Pj
3
= − ∑ βmk Pk
∂Xj
k=1

for j = 1,2,3 ;

for j = 4 .

In Equations (4.6a) and (4.6b), k and j are indices across the four
claim types, while m is an index across the explanatory variables in
Xi.6 The control variables in this analysis are gender, age, the worker
replacement rate, and whether the worker’s ﬁrm self-insures.
Table 4.3 presents the sample means for the 3,104 claimants employed by ﬁrms in our sample data: 11 percent are fractures, contusion, or cuts; 21 percent are back sprains or strains; 18 percent are other
sprains or strains; and 49 percent are all other injury types. The means
for the independent variables are about the same as those in Table 3.3
of the last chapter. This claimant sample has slightly more males than
females, an average age of 40, relatively low reported average weekly
wages, and a relatively high replacement rate. Across the injury types,
the claimants show little variation in HRM practices among their ﬁrms
except for Employee Participation in Financial Returns (EPFR) and Information Sharing (INFOSHR), where the standard deviation is signiﬁ-
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Injury types
Total sample
(3,104)

Fracture, contusion,
and cuts (345)

Back sprain and
strain (667)

Other sprain and
strain (557)

All other types of
injuries (1,535)

0.424
(0.494)

0.383
(0.487)

0.351
(0.478)

0.429
(0.465)

0.463
(0.499)

EPDM

3.350
(1.376)

3.116
(1.350)

3.349
(1.460)

3.232
(1.308)

3.447
(1.360)

EPFR

3.241
(2.291)

3.107
(2.142)

2.751
(2.004)

3.303
(2.358)

3.461
(2.381)

MGTCULT

22.877
(1.706)

22.986
(1.615)

23.099
(1.780)

22.774
(1.760)

22.793
(1.664)

EPDEG

8.232
(1.005)

8.157
(1.005)

8.084
(1.089)

8.201
(1.087)

8.325
(0.924)

INFOSHR

21.423
(4.838)

21.128
(4.991)

20.640
(4.716)

21.557
(4.755)

21.782
(4.847)

Variable
Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables
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Control variables
0.550
(0.497)

0.664
(0.473)

0.504
(0.500)

0.530
(0.500)

0.551
(0.498)

EEAGE

3.634
(0.304)

3.642
(0.324)

3.567
(0.305)

3.598
(0.300)

3.633
(0.297)

RRATE

4.273
(0.178)

4.271
(0.195)

4.278
(0.175)

4.264
(0.167)

4.275
(0.181)

SELF

0.241
(0.428)

0.223
(0.417)

0.375
(0.484)

0.237
(0.426)

0.189
(0.392)

NOTE: See Table 3.3 for data sources and calculations.
a
Based on parameter estimates reported in Table 4.5.
b
The standard errors given for the elasticities are asymptotic approximations based on the estimated standard errors in Table 4.5.
Therefore, the standard errors for the elasticities are a much less reliable indicator of the statistical signiﬁcance of a particular variable
than are the chi-square tests given in Table 4.5.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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cantly larger than it is for the other HRM practices. For both of these
HRM practices, claimants with back sprains work in ﬁrms with fewer
ﬁnancial returns programs (2.75 for back sprains versus 3.24 across all
injury types) and with less information sharing (20.64 for back sprains
versus 21.42 across all injury types). This is consistent with the claimsreporting moral hazard information of claims ﬁling: in ﬁrms with fewer
HRM practices, more hard-to-monitor (lower back sprain) claims are
ﬁled. However, these raw descriptive differences do not necessarily
measure the inﬂuence of HRM practices: other confounding variables
may be simultaneously inﬂuencing injury types.
To control for these other potentially confounding variables, we use
a multinomial logit model in which the type of claim ﬁled is made a
function of the same variables used in the analysis of claim duration in
the last chapter. The multinomial logit estimates of the ﬁrst three claim
types in Table 4.3, relative to the “other sprains and strains” category,
are reported in Table 4.5 for 3,104 claims for which we have complete
data on the HRM practice, demographic, and occupational and industry
control variables. The chi-square statistics in Table 4.5 indicate that the
Downsizing variable and two of the HRM practice variables, Employee Participation in Financial Returns (EPFR) and Information Sharing
(INFOSHR), are statistically insigniﬁcant, while the degree and intensity
of Employee Participation in Decision Making (EPDEG and EPDM) and
Management Safety Culture (MGTCULT) variables are signiﬁcant.
Since the multinomial logit coefﬁcients do not represent the marginal effects of different characteristics on the probability of making a
particular type of claim, we transform the coefﬁcients to partial derivatives and, for ease of comparison, express the coefﬁcients as semi-elasticities. These semi-elasticities, with their approximate standard errors
in parentheses, are reported in Table 4.4. The semi-elasticities provide
only weak evidence of claims-reporting moral hazard. Consistent with
the explanation that HRM practices lower workers’ compensation costs
by decreasing claims-reporting hazard, an increase in any of the four
HRM practices (except Management Safety Culture) lowers the likelihood of a lower back sprain claim being ﬁled. For example, adding another program that involves the worker in ﬁrm decision making (EPDM
increases by 1) will lower the likelihood of a lower back sprain claim
being ﬁled by 1.5 percent. Adding another program that increases the
worker’s involvement in the ﬁnancial returns of the company lowers the
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Table 4.4 Semi-Elasticity Estimates of the Effects of Human Resource
Policies on the Type of Injurya : Multinomial Logit Regressionb
(standard error in parentheses)
Injury types

Variable
Intercept

Fracture,
contusion,
and cuts

Back sprain
and strain

Other sprain
and strain

All other types
of injuries

−4.877
(1.36)

5.301
(1.11)

2.573
(.14)

−2.139
(1.00)

−.015
(.28)

−.0147
(.28)

−.017
(.30)

.106
(.15)

−.150
(.09)
.051
(.10)
.141
(1.34)
−.225
(.42)
.020
(.30)

−.015
(.10)
−.011
(.11)
.015
(1.11)
−.068
(.39)
−.007
(.26)

−.134
(.13)
.074
(.12)
.025
(.32)
−.123
(.37)
.009
(.31)

.089
(.10)
−.034
(.14)
−.047
(.96)
.125
(.29)
−.005
(.32)

.274
(.14)
.503
(.23)
.170
(.12)
.071
(.10)

.107
(.16)
−.592
(.20)
−.801
(.09)
.418
(.09)

−.117
(.12)
−.219
(.12)
−.396
(.08)
−.020
(.09)

−.066
(.12)
.223
(.18)
.453
(.14)
−.190
(.08)

Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables
EPDM
EPFR
MGTCULT
EPDEG
INFOSHR

Control variables
MALE
EEAGE
RRATE
SELF

NOTE: The speciﬁcation also includes dummy variables for years, industry, and workers’
occupation, but the corresponding coefﬁcients are not reported here. While none of
these control variables were statistically signiﬁcant individually, log-likelihood ratio
tests indicate that they were jointly signiﬁcant at greater than the 0.01 level.
a
Based on parameter estimates reported in Table 4.5.
b
The standard errors given for the elasticities are asymptotic approximations based
on the estimated standard errors in Table 4.5. Therefore, the standard errors for
the elasticities are a much less reliable indicator of the statistical signiﬁcance of a
particular variable than are the chi-square tests given in Table 4.5.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.5 The Effects of Human Resource Policies on the Type of Injury:
Multinomial Logit Regression (standard error in parentheses)
Injury typesa

Variable

Fracture,
contusion,
and cuts

Intercept

−7.450***
(2.62)

Back sprain
and strain

All other types
of injuries

x2 b

2.730
(2.16)

−4.712**
(1.92)

24.90***

.002
(.19)

.002
(.16)

.032
(.14)

.09

−.015
(.07)
−.023
(.08)
.116*
(.07)
−.102
(.11)
.011
(.02)

.119**
(.06)
−.085
(.07)
−.010
(.06)
.055
(.09)
−.015
(.02)

.223***
(.05)
−.108*
(.06)
−.072
(.05)
.248***
(.08)
−.014
(.01)

24.61***

.391**
(.18)
.721***
(.24)
.566
(.45)
.090
(.24)

.224
(.15)
−.373*
(.20)
−.406
(.37)
.437**
(.19)

.051
(.13)
.442**
(.17)
.849***
(.32)
−.171
(.17)

6.49*

Downsizing variable
DOWNSIZE

HRM variables
EPDM
EPFR
MGTCULT
EPDEG
INFOSHR

4.10
10.33**
17.78***
2.85

Control variables
MALE
EEAGE
RRATE
SELF

34.14***
18.99***
15.70***

NOTE: Total number of injuries was 3,104; −2 log likelihood = 7303.86. * signiﬁcant
at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test);
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
The speciﬁcation also includes dummy variables for years, industry, and workers’
occupation, but the corresponding coefﬁcients are not reported here. While none of
these control variables were statistically signiﬁcant individually, log-likelihood ratio
tests indicate that they were jointly signiﬁcant at better than the 0.01 level.
a
The omitted injury type is “Other sprain and strain.”
b
Chi-square statistics for each variable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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likelihood of a lower back sprain claim being ﬁled by 1.1 percent. The
moral hazard explanation implies an ambiguous impact for the Management Safety Culture coefﬁcient, and it is the only HRM practice that
is not negative.
However, the evidence that HRM practices reduce claims-reporting moral hazard is ambiguous for two reasons. First, HRM effects on
lower back sprains are empirically small (i.e., the semi-elasticities are
small in magnitude). While the EPDM and EPDEG are statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 4.5 in the right-hand column for the test of joint signiﬁcance), the switch away from the potentially moral-hazard-laden lower
back sprain category as these programs increase is too small to account
for the magnitude of effect reﬂected in the HRM reduction of workers’
compensation costs in Tables 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6 of Chapter 3.
Second, the multinomial estimates provide no corroborative evidence of moral hazard behavior with regard to other (non-HR) results:
Downsizing has no impact on claim types, increases in the replacement
rate do not increase the proportion of lower back sprains, and self-insurance does not lower the proportion of lower back sprains. As the
replacement rate increases, the opportunity cost of being out of work
on a workers’ compensation claim falls. Claims-reporting moral hazard
will likely increase, especially for injuries (such as lower back sprains)
whose work origin is difﬁcult to monitor or detect. Hence, an increase
in claims-reporting moral hazard ought to increase the proportion of
low back sprains.
Similarly, ﬁrms that self-insure their workers’ compensation claims
have the greatest incentive to monitor claims for moral hazard behavior
since they bear the full cost of such behavior, whereas ﬁrms that are
not fully experience-rated do not. For this reason, if claims-reporting
moral hazard were signiﬁcant, we would expect those ﬁrms that self-insure to have relatively fewer lower back claims. However, proportionately fewer lower back claims are ﬁled for those ﬁrms that have higher
replacement rates or that do not self-insure. Hence, the Downsizing
(DOWNSIZE), Beneﬁt Replacement Rate (RRATE), and Firm’s Self-Insured
Status (SELF) coefﬁcients have the opposite impact on the ﬁling of lower
back sprains if the ﬁling of lower back sprains mostly reﬂects moral
hazard behavior.
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CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter 1, we noted that HRM practices can affect any one of
the three dimensions of reported injury loss. First, they can affect the
propensity to ﬁle a claim, even if the intrinsic workplace risk remains
unchanged. Workers’ reporting propensities are affected by the degree
of insurance coverage, so there is a claims-reporting moral hazard. Intrinsic risk is the level of physical danger of accidental injury or occupational disease that is the result of workers’ producing output, and
injury costs may be reduced by modifying either or both of the following: by changing workers’ incentives to take care (through changes in
risk-bearing moral hazard), or by modifying the ergonomic aspects of
the physical workplace, including employing processes, procedures, or
equipment that reduce on-the-job injuries.
We have given three explanations for our ﬁndings of the last two
chapters of why HRM practices reduce workers’ compensation costs:
1) Claims-reporting moral hazard changes with HRM practices,
2) Risk-bearing moral hazard changes with HRM practices, and
3) Intrinsic risk improves (independent of employees’ change in
safety behavior) with HRM practices.
Our evidence is more supportive of the latter two explanations than
it is of the ﬁrst.
Claims-reporting moral hazard. Our ﬁndings do not consistently
support a claims-reporting moral hazard explanation of why HRM practices reduce workers’ compensation costs. We ﬁnd no strong evidence
that the Downsizing effect represents a moral hazard effect, either of the
risk-bearing or claims-reporting type. Thus it is tenuous to view Downsizing or HRM practice interactions as providing tests for moral hazard
behavior. This is the reason that we also analyzed the impact of HRM
practices on claim denials and claim types in this chapter.
The analysis of this chapter provides little evidence that HRM practices operate solely, or mostly, through a reduction in claims-reporting moral hazard. The only HRM practice that appears to signiﬁcantly
reduce the likelihood of a claim denial is Employee Participation in
Financial Returns, which, although consistently exhibiting the expected

Butler&Park.indb 80

6/22/2005 11:51:49 AM

Reduced Moral Hazard or Increased Efﬁciency? 81

sign in all of the analyses in this book, remains a relatively small effect.
Employee Participation in Financial Returns is marginally signiﬁcant in
the claims denial analysis; Employee Participation in Financial Returns
is marginally insigniﬁcant in the multinomial logit analysis.
All HRM practices do have the expected impact on the ﬁling of
hard-to-monitor claims (such as lower back sprains and strains) in the
multinomial logit regression. This is evidence of claims-reporting moral
hazard. But the estimated effect is small, too small to explain why these
programs reduce workers’ compensation costs as much as they appear
to do. Moreover, the coefﬁcients of other ancillary variables that would
also indicate the presence of claims-reporting moral hazard—DOWNSIZE,
RRATE, and SELF—do not have the expected sign.
This doesn’t mean that moral hazard isn’t important, only that the
claims denial and multinomial logit results indicate that HRM practices
do not reduce workers’ compensation solely, or even mainly, through
reductions in claims-reporting moral hazard response.
Risk-bearing moral hazard. The results are also consistent with
changes in risk-bearing moral hazard. But a risk-bearing moral hazard
explanation of the HRM impact accommodates the claim denial results
more readily than does a claims-reporting explanation. With a change in
the number of real injuries (as might come through a reduction in riskbearing moral hazard), there would be no change in claim denials on the
basis of employee claims-reporting moral hazard since there would be
no grounds on which to contest the validity of these claims. Moreover,
changes in workers’ risk-bearing activities would have an ambiguous
impact on the types of claims ﬁled, hence HRM practices would have
an indeterminate effect on the distribution of claims even if the HRM
practices served to change the degree of risk-bearing behavior on the
part of workers.
Change in real safety, independent of any change in workers’
safety behavior. Besides a change in risk as workers change their risktaking behaviors, there can be changes in risk brought about by the introduction of better safety information, better safety practices, better safety
equipment, and better allocation of labor to heterogeneous tasks even
if workers don’t change their behavior because of insurance coverage.
Involvement of workers in strategic safety planning or in the ﬁnancial
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returns of the ﬁrm leads to more efﬁcient safety outcomes if workers are
the least-cost provider of safety information and safety processes. This
explanation would also be consistent with the results reported in this
book. It seems to us to be a plausible research lead to pursue.

Notes
1. Beneﬁts replace only two-thirds of lost wages, subject to a maximum beneﬁt
(which restricts most potential recipients’ income to less than two-thirds) and a
waiting period (three days in Minnesota) during which no beneﬁts are received.
Moreover, there are no beneﬁts paid for pain and suffering.
2. Claim duration may rise or fall, depending on whether the change in claim
frequency substantially shifts the relative number of short- and long-duration
claims. If this composition effect is small, we would expect the average claim
duration to increase with downsizing as injury severity increases with injury
risk.
3. Logistic regressions for claim denials with Downsizing interaction variables
were also estimated, analogously to the duration estimates in Table 3.3 of the
last chapter. However, none of the interactions were statistically signiﬁcant at
the 0.05 level (and none at all in the full model with the control variables). These
results are not reported here.
4. Butler, Hartwig, and Gardner (1997) ﬁnd, in a panel data set of selected states
followed during the 1980s, that HMOs indeed have a greater tendency to classify claims as compensable under workers’ compensation than do independent
physicians. Their ﬁndings suggest that real workers’ compensation costs might
have declined during the period except for the rapid expansion of HMOs and
the perverse incentives generated by the potential dual coverage (i.e., workers’
compensation or the per-capitated plan) of various health conditions.
5. See the discussion in Maddala (1983), especially p. 77.
6. Standard errors for the semi-elasticity estimates are computed by taking square
roots of the diagonal elements of the matrix ZSZ', where S = Cov(βij) and
1−P1 −P2 −P3
−P1 1−P2 −P3
Z =
−P1 −P2 1−P3
−P1 −P2 −P3
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5
How Much Safety Is Desirable?
CAUTIONS AND OUR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Our results are conditioned on the sample we employed: mediumsized and small ﬁrms. Most of the ﬁrms were concerned with safety. In
this regard, we believe that our sample is representative of small-to-medium-sized ﬁrms. Our survey response rate was relatively high. Even
though our survey instrument measured more dimensions of safety
management than any previous study, there still may be omitted factors—factors for which we do not have any controls. This is a possible
shortcoming in every study that does not employ completely random
assignment, and one we hope we have minimized here by employing a
rather extensive list of ﬁrm management and safety factors. And while
our sample consists of those ﬁrms that applied to the Minnesota Safety
Grant Program, we have no reason to believe that these ﬁrms are substantially different from ﬁrms in general. Nevertheless, our results are
strictly valid for only those ﬁrms included in our sample.
Job requirements, both for the ﬁrms in our sample and for the United States, have become increasingly specialized. This specialization has
taken place not only in the levels of technical know-how required but in
the organizational tools speciﬁc to each ﬁrm. Loss of skilled labor in the
competitive marketplace can be especially costly, as it often takes two
to six months to train new workers. Firms that can retain their skilled
workers in productive employment have a competitive advantage over
those that cannot. While there has been a lot written on the importance
of maintaining skilled employees by reducing job leaving, it is rarely
noted that ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital is also lost when employees temporarily leave because of workers’ compensation claims.
In this study we analyze the impact of various human resource management practices on a ﬁrm’s workers’ compensation costs. We partitioned HRM practices into two groups: 1) practices that the ﬁrm can
unilaterally adopt that do not necessarily involve the workers in either
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the ﬁnancial or the strategic management of the ﬁrm, and 2) practices
that increase workers’ involvement with the ﬁrm in one or both of these
dimensions. Among the former, known as management environmental
factors, we include Management Safety Culture (MGTCULT, the degree of
management involvement with the safety efforts of the ﬁrm) and Information Sharing (INFOSHR) as variables. Among the latter group of HRM
practices, those with explicit worker involvement, we have three variables to approximate different dimensions of employee participation:
1) the number of programs that allow the employee to participate in
the ﬁnancial returns of the company (EPFR), 2) the number of programs
that allow the employee to participate in the strategic planning of the
company (EPDM), and 3) the intensity of the employee’s involvement in
the strategic planning of the company (EPDEG).
Of these ﬁve dimensions, we ﬁnd that greater information sharing
by management and greater intensity in the ﬁrm’s strategic planning by
employees raises rather than lowers workers’ compensation costs. Increased information sharing by management with employees increases
claim frequency by as much as it decreases claim duration, so the net
effect is a small and insigniﬁcantly positive increase in costs. The insigniﬁcant net impact on costs is consistent with the results in Chapter
4: greater information sharing doesn’t increase the likelihood of claim
denials, as would be expected if there were substantial claims-reporting
moral hazard, nor is it associated with a shift in the distribution of injury
types, as would be expected if there were risk-bearing moral hazard
present.
On the other hand, the intensity of employee involvement has a
positive net impact on workers’ compensation costs as a result of a 19
percent increase in the duration of a claim for each unit increase in the
intensity index. Since this index measures intensity of worker involvement on a scale of 2 to 10, with higher scores indicating that workers
feel they “always” have control over their job tasks and “always” participate in employee involvement programs, we had hypothesized that
more intense involvement would lead to lower costs. The opposite appears to be true. In the samples, the mean intensity scores were around
8, indicating that employees participate rather intensely in the activities
at their ﬁrm. There are at least two explanations for this unexpected
result of higher costs: 1) a greater sense of privilege when hurt, and 2)
more risk taking. The former explanation hinges on a sense of owner-
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ship—meaning a greater sense of entitlement—when an employee gets
injured, so that he feels justiﬁed in taking more time to recover from his
work injury. The latter explanation has to do with the employee feeling
that he has more control over his job than he had in the past. Because
of this feeling of control, he is willing to take more job risks that result
in more serious injuries. The latter explanation is consistent with the
results reported in Chapter 4: larger values of the Intensity of Employee
Participation (EPDEG) don’t increase the likelihood of claim denials, but
they do signiﬁcantly shift the distribution of injury claims toward the
“all other” category, which tends to have longer claim duration.
Increases in any of our three main HRM practices—EPDM, Employee Participation in Decision Making; EPFR, Employee Participation in
Financial Returns; and MGTCULT, the level of management involvement
in the safety processes of the ﬁrm—all lead to substantial reductions in
workers’ compensation costs per employee. In Table 3.6, we measured
per-employee safety gains both as a unit change in each of these indices
and as a change to the “best practice” levels.
As an example of a unit change interpretation of our results, we ﬁnd
that if a ﬁrm were to go from using two to using three ﬁnancial return
programs (EPFR went from 2 to 3), then claim frequency would fall by
23 percent and claim duration would fall by 13 percent. Lost work-time
beneﬁt costs would fall by 36 percent (the combined impact of frequency and duration outcomes), which when multiplied by the average
indemnity cost per employee of $175.50 yields a cost reduction in losttime expenses of $63.18 per employee per year. This is the approximate
reduction in per-employee costs of adding another plan in which the
employee shares in the ﬁnancial returns of the company—that is, of
making a unit change in the HRM practices.
There is another interpretation of the results: suppose that the ﬁrm
were to go from an average, 50th percentile ﬁrm to an 84th percentile
ﬁrm, i.e., to one of the top 16 percent of ﬁrms. If “best practice” ﬁrms
were those with the highest 16 percent of EPFR values, what would be
the change in costs of moving from the 50th percentile to the 84th percentile? This change is a one-standard-deviation change in the value of
the EPFR; in this case, the standard deviation would be a change of approximately 1.211 more programs. (In such a case, a standard deviation
change is small because there is little variation across our sample ﬁrms
in the number of ﬁnancial return programs they offer to employees.)
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When we add one standard deviation more of EPFR programs to their
current offerings, then costs fall by 1.211 × $63.18, or by $76.51.
The best-practice interpretation of our ﬁndings is probably the most
relevant, given the sample variation in these alternative HRM practices
across ﬁrms. As indicated by the far right-hand column in Table 3.6, an
average ﬁrm that becomes a best-practice ﬁrm in EPDM saves about $36
per employee per year, an important level of savings but only half of the
best-practice savings available from EPFR.
The HRM practice that represents the largest cost savings per employee is Management Safety Culture. A ﬁrm that increases its level of
involvement from the average to the best-practice level of MGTCULT, a
variable increase of about 3, saves about $180 per year per employee.
In a ﬁrm with 100 employees, this is an annual savings of $18,000 in
lost-time pay alone. This is likely to be a lower bound on the beneﬁts
derived from improving management safety culture. In addition to the
lost-time pay costs, medical costs will be saved, and employees’ level
of job satisfaction may well increase as well. Uncompensated wage loss
and pain and suffering associated with injuries will fall, reducing the
compensating wages paid to workers. Perhaps equally important in our
highly skilled labor market, more ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital can be
retained as the number of days out due to injuries falls.
Since these are potentially signiﬁcant savings, it is useful to understand which one of three channels they are achieved through: 1) claim
reductions due to less claims-reporting moral hazard, 2) claim reductions due to less risk-bearing moral hazard, or 3) claim reductions due
to more efﬁcient use of safety resources. The empirical models in Chapter 4 were an attempt to sort out these alternative explanations. We ﬁnd,
as is consistent with prior research, evidence of claims-reporting moral
hazard with respect to increases in the replacement rate: claim duration and claim denials increase with higher beneﬁt replacement ratios.
However, we ﬁnd no strong evidence that a higher level of any of the
HRM practice variables changes employee behavior, whether in regard
to employees’ willingness to report claims or employees’ willingness to
bear on-the-job risk. There is some evidence that EPFR is consistent with
a reduction in risk-bearing moral hazard, but the magnitude of the effect
is too small to account for the relatively large EPFR effect on costs. Others should pursue these questions with larger samples from other states,
but in the meantime, we are left to conclude that the HRM practice ef-
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fects operate mainly through the third channel: the more management
and worker involvement there is with the safety processes of the ﬁrm,
the safer the workplace becomes. Safety outcomes improve as safety
resources are used more efﬁciently.1
IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRMS
The most important HRM best practice was found to be increasing
management involvement with the safety programs of the ﬁrm. The
measured safety gains associated with the MGTCULT variable are substantial, enough so that they are likely to be cost-effective when the
costs associated with these activities are taken into account. Recall that
MGTCULT is a Likert scale index of responses to the following issues:
1) management’s support for clear goals and objectives on safety
and health policy,
2) management’s leadership in setting goals on safety and health,
3) management’s interest in safety and health issues as a part of
the ﬁrm’s strategic level of decision making,
4) management’s willingness to share safety-related information
with employees, and
5) management’s commitment to reemployment of disabled
workers and to having a return-to-work program for injured
employees.
None of the ﬁrst four characteristics of good management safety
culture listed involve any signiﬁcant cost to implement. Only the ﬁfth,
a commitment to a proactive return-to-work program, may be costly.
While evidence on the costs of an effective return-to-work program is
lacking, there is some evidence on its beneﬁts. Hunt et al. (1993), in
their sample of larger Michigan ﬁrms, report that the presence of a proactive return-to-work program signiﬁcantly lowers workers’ compensation claim rates. Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin (1995) ﬁnd that all three
types of job accommodations they measured increase the likelihood of
a successful return to work for their sample of severely injured workers:
reduced-hour accommodations had the smallest impact, followed by
light-work accommodations, and offering modiﬁed equipment had the
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greatest impact on a successful return to work. However, their data did
not contain any information on the costs of providing such accommodations. But while the cost-effectiveness of accommodations is not well
understood, the evidence certainly suggests that there are some beneﬁts
from having a proactive return-to-work policy in place.
Though employee participation programs also lower workers’ compensation costs, it is more difﬁcult to interpret how cost-effective they
might be, because we have no measure of the ﬁrm’s cost of implementing these programs. At the very least, involvement of workers with the
decision making of the ﬁrm involves time away from the production
line. This type of forgone output cost may be small, but the ﬁrm would
have to weigh the implicit loss of output against the beneﬁts we estimate here. We think that calculation will be favorable to employee participation in decision-making-type programs: only a few workers serve
on the ﬁrm’s safety committee, but our measured per-capita beneﬁts
from having a committee apply to all workers.
The same cost-beneﬁt concerns apply to EPFR-type programs: clearly there are (perhaps unanticipated) safety beneﬁts from having employees participate in the ﬁnancial returns to the ﬁrm. But again, these
would need to be weighed across the costs. Since 401(k), proﬁt-sharing,
and other such programs are probably instituted for reasons unrelated
to workplace safety, our ﬁndings should tend to conﬁrm their use as a
cost-effective HRM practice.
The evidence from Chapter 4 strongly suggests that HRM practices
work not so much by changing workers’ safety behavior but by improving the safety outcomes of the ﬁrm through more efﬁcient use of safety
resources. Workers apparently are the lowest-cost provider of information on safety risk and safety improvements, so integrating workers into
the strategic planning of the ﬁrm and the ﬁnancial returns of the ﬁrm
lowers workers’ compensation costs. Hence there seem to be two unqualiﬁed messages from this research: management involvement with
ﬁrm safety is important, and workers—even if the ﬁrm chooses not to
involve them in exactly the types of programs described here—seem to
provide useful information on safety outcomes when given the chance.
Both worker and management involvement, in the appropriate context,
are essential to achieve the optimal level of workplace safety.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS
So far, most disability policy and research—including policy that
affects and research that examines workers’ compensation programs—
have implicitly assumed that the worker’s role is passive, except possibly for claims-reporting moral hazard. It has been assumed that only
the employer can handle the formulation and implementation of effective workplace safety programs. This research clariﬁes the potentially
important role that employees play in workplace safety processes. Human resource management practices affect safety on the job: the more
employees are involved with strategic safety decisions and with the ﬁnancial returns of the ﬁrm, the lower the workers’ compensation costs
will be. Moreover, those costs are lowered not only because workers are
less likely to ﬁle an injury claim, but because their involvement in the
safety process changes workplace risk. It is as if the ﬁrm, by involving
workers, had “hired” cost-effective safety consultants. This should not
be too surprising; employees engaged in the production process probably know more about workplace risks than either managers or outside
consultants.
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POLICY
One of the advantages of focusing on a sample from a single state is
that workers’ compensation parameters are held constant. Focusing on
a sample of ﬁrms from Minnesota means that we didn’t have to worry
about differences in beneﬁt schedules, waiting periods, or administrative procedures. This was appropriate given our concentration on differences in HRM practices within the workers’ compensation system.
We have, therefore, nothing to say about how changes in workers’ compensation policy or administration may affect the results reported here,
except for one obvious implication: any policy or practice in the state’s
workers’ compensation program that prohibits or discourages the types
of HRM practices analyzed here would likely be counterproductive.
In other words, in competitive markets, where ﬁrms are looking for
skilled labor and seeking optimal HRM policies (policies that minimize
the sum of the accident costs, as discussed in Chapter 1), the workers’
compensation administrator’s role should be minimal. Administrators
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should see that beneﬁts are quickly and fairly paid and that ﬁrms bear
the appropriate accident costs under the law. Under these conditions,
where it is cost-effective, employee participation will occur, and managers will become more involved with the safety processes of their ﬁrm.
However, not all ﬁrms are alike: safety committees may be more effective in some ﬁrms than others. Our research does not ﬁnd that the workers’ compensation or public policy administrator should mandate these
practices, only that they should not, as a matter of public safety policy,
prohibit them from being implemented.

Note
1. This is not strictly correct, of course, since we only measure some of the beneﬁts of HRM practices in our empirical research. We do not measure all of the
beneﬁts, perhaps not even the most important beneﬁt (which would be the retention of productive skilled labor on the job). Nor do we measure any of the costs
involved in the implementation of these programs. We hope that future research
can address these issues.
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About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonproﬁt research organization devoted to ﬁnding and promoting solutions to employment-related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of
the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established
in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder
of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment
income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists;
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal
research program by providing ﬁnancial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in
the ﬁeld; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
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